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 Distributed Operations and Urban Combat are two key issues facing the United 
States Marine Corps of today and the future.  Scenarios, based upon data from Operation 
al-Fajr, conducted in Fallujah, Iraq, in November 2004, explore the applicability of the 
Distributed Operations Platoon to urban combat operations.  The terrain of Range 200, 
Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command, Twentynine Palms, California, is 
used as a comparative terrain to examine the effects of different urban environments on 
the outcomes of urban combat.  The United States Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command is exploring and developing Distributed Operations doctrine.  Distributed 
Operations and Military Operations on Urban Terrain training facility development are 
intended to benefit from this research 
 This thesis entailed the modeling of 12,400 agent-based urban combat 
experiments to answer the following questions: 
  (1) Is there a difference in battle outcomes due to the substitution of 
Distributed Operation forces for Traditional Infantry forces? 
  (2) Does the nature of the urban terrain affect the outcome? 
The United States Marine Corps Distributed Operations infantry platoon, under 
conceptual and doctrinal development, could be a force suitable for combat in an urban 
environment.  The primary null hypothesis of this research addresses the forces employed 
in urban combat.  This hypothesis states that the Distributed Operations infantry platoon 
is as capable in urban combat as the traditional infantry platoon.    
and terrain modeled.  
 The following graphic (Figure S1) depicts the principal elements of the combat 
models; specifically, the forces. 
Section of Jolan District Modeled in MANA
Range 200 Modeled in MANA
 
Figure  S1 The Terrains and Blue Forces Modeled in the Scenarios 
 
A secondary null hypothesis concerns urban terrain, namely whether Range 200 
Military Operations on Urban Terrain Training Facility located at Twentynine Palms, Ca, 
affects urban combat with the same similitude of a comparably sized section of the Jolan 
District of Fallujah, Iraq. 
 Creating agent-based models is an ideal vehicle to explore both null hypotheses.  
Therefore, this thesis generated a model of Distributed Operations and Traditional 
Platoons on urban terrains and the opposing insurgent forces.  The model is created in the 
Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) modeling environment.  The simulation 
focuses on the actions of the individual agents who comprise the platoon, attachments, 
insurgents and non-combatants.   
An experimental design is incorporated into the research to examine the 
hypotheses.  Parametric testing was examined.  Elements of the data are found to violate 
the assumptions required for a parametric analysis.  Consequently, the data are examined 
with non-parametric methods.  The results indicate that there is only a 0.1% chance of 
seeing similar results (or values that are more discordant) if the data are all from the same 
 xviii
 xix
population.  The analysis of the different scenarios shows that there is a statistically 
significant difference between each of the models. 
As modeled, the findings are:  
• There is a difference in outcomes attributable to the type of forces 
employed and the nature of the urban battlefield terrain, 
• The terrain effect is more pronounced in the Distributed Operations Force, 
• The increased density of the Military Operations on Urban Terrain training 
facility terrain led to lower performance of the Distributed Operations 
Platoon when compared to the Traditional infantry Platoon, 
• The Distributed Operations Platoon attained a higher measure of 
effectiveness than the Traditional Platoon in the reduced density of the 
urban terrain of Fallujah,  
• For each unit, the performance was notably higher when the attacks 
occurred on the Fallujah terrain than on the Military Operations on Urban 
Terrain training facility terrain, 
• Above all other factors examined, the ability of the forces to be able to 
classify their enemy had the greatest influence on the outcome of the 
battle. 
These finding in retrospect are sensible and confirm what is expected from a 
realistic simulation of these events.  Visual assessments of multiple runs of the simulation 
appear to explain the relationship of terrain to the effectiveness of the Distributed 
Operations Platoon.  In  denser terrain, the enhance situational awareness of the 
Distributed Operations Platoon, appears to draw agents to the known threats on the 
battlefield.  This, in turn, exposes them to fire from threats that exist but are at the time 
unknown. 
Combat Marines from the Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command at 
Twentynine Palms, California were surveyed for their opinions and observations from 
urban combat in Iraq and the Military Operations on Urban Terrain training received as 
 xx
compared to their combat experiences.  The Marines interviewed responded that Military 
Operations on Urban Terrain training facilities were large enough and sufficient to 
prepare them for urban combat.  However, a preponderance of those surveyed reported 
that interior and exterior realism was less than satisfactory.  The information gained from 
the survey was applied to enhance the model design and analysis.  
The insights and findings of this research have been provided to the following 
commands: Marine Corps Combat Development Command—Operations Analysis 
Directorate, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory—Project Albert, Marine Corps 
Training and Education Command, and Marine Air Ground Task Force Training 
Command to assist in concept and doctrine development.   
 xxi
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The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within 
the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic errors, 
they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without 





























Fallujah is a significant example of what we’re going to face in the future.  
It’s about individual Marines with small arms going house to house 
killing. 
We are on a Distributed Ops battlefield right now.  That’s how the enemy 
is fighting us. 
Distributed Operations builds upon our philosophy and themes introduced 
by the “three-block war.” 
While ever ready to respond to major combat operations, the future holds 
a greater likelihood of irregular wars fought in urban environments, 
against thinking enemies using asymmetric tactics.  Thus, we will adapt 
our tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as technology to enhance 
our capabilities to succeed in these environments. 
      —General Michael Hagee, Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Distributed Operations (DO) and Urban Combat are two key issues facing the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC) of today and the future.  Handling these issues will 
significantly affect the 21st century Marine Corps.  These two elements may determine 
whether the USMC will “remain the world’s foremost expeditionary warfighting 
organization.”  The USMC DO infantry platoon, under conceptual and doctrinal 
development, has the potential to be a force suitable for combat in an urban environment.  
A DO Platoon may be better suited to the urban task than a traditional USMC infantry 
Platoon.  Yet, to date, the effectiveness of a DO Platoon in an urban environment has yet 
to be quantitatively examined.   
This issue serves as the basis for the principal hypothesis of this research.  A 
hypothesis represents a theory that is a basis for argument.  Statistical hypothesis testing 
deals with an argument that has the potential to be true, called the null hypothesis.  It also 
concerns an argument that is statistically supported if the null hypothesis is rejected.  This 
is called the alternative hypothesis.  
2 
 
For the purpose of this research, the primary null hypothesis addresses the forces 
employed in urban combat.  This hypothesis states that the USMC DO infantry platoon 
(or “DO Platoon”) is as capable in urban combat as the traditional USMC infantry 
platoon (referred to as the “Traditional Platoon”).  The alternative to the null hypothesis 
is that the DO Platoon is more or less capable than a Traditional Platoon in conventional 
urban combat. 
A secondary null hypothesis concerns urban terrain, namely whether Range 200 
Military Operations on Urban Terrain Training Facility (“MOUT terrain”) located at 
Twentynine Palms, Ca, affects urban combat with the similitude of a comparably sized 
section of the Jolan District of Fallujah, Iraq. 
 Creating agent-based models (ABM) is an ideal vehicle to explore both null 
hypotheses.  Analyzing the data from the models will determine if sufficient statistical 





We must build forces that draw upon the revolutionary advances in the 
technology of war … one that relies more heavily on stealth, precision 
weaponry, and information technologies. 
      —President George W. Bush 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to create an agent-based simulation to serve as a 
foundation for future work in developing the DO concept and for examining urban 
combat.  A model of a DO and Traditional Platoon, urban terrains, and opposing 
insurgent forces is the focus of this thesis.  The model is created in the Map Aware Non-
Uniform Automata (MANA) modeling environment.  The simulation focuses on the 
actions of the individual agents who comprise the platoon, attachments, insurgents and 
non-combatants.  Thus, the primary intent is to study the effects of the DO concept and 
3 
terrain on a unit’s ability to accomplish an assault on a defended urban area.  The insights 
and findings of this research will be provided to the sponsoring commands to assist in 
concept and doctrine development: 
• Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL)—Project Albert 
•  Marine Corps Concept Development Command (MCCDC) 
o Operations Analysis Directorate (OAD) 
o Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM) 
o Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command (MAGTFTC)   
 
C. MOTIVATION AND GOALS 
 
Units trained in distributed operations would be very useful in urban 
environments or counter insurgency scenarios. 
—Brigadier General Schmidle, Director, Expeditionary Force 
Development Center 
 
MCWL has been tasked by the MCCDC to prepare a DO Platoon to deploy in an 
experimental capacity with a US Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations 
Capable) (MEU (SOC)) for use in Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations 
in the Sea Viking experiment scheduled for 2006.  (Distributed Operations 2006 
Capabilities and Enhancements Report, Dec 2004)  Experiments and studies have begun 
in order to develop DO doctrine in response to the tasking.  Although MCCDC 
acknowledges that DO may have a place in urban warfare, current plans do not explore 
the application.  The intention is to “examine DO in an urban setting in follow-on 
experimentation.”  (Questions and Answers about Distributed Operations, 2005)  
MCWL’s Project Albert is a research and development effort that uses high 
performance computing to model, examine, and understand issues and concepts in order 
to address decision-makers’ questions.  (Project Albert, 2005)  There has been growing 
interest in the defense community regarding the modeling and simulation of urban 
4 
combat, and Project Albert has been involved in numerous vanguard efforts (see 
Appendix A for a detailed list of agencies involved in modeling and simulation of the 
urban environment.) 
Marine Corps Training Commands are not prone to waiting in the wings for 
doctrine to be handed to them.  The commands strive to develop concepts and doctrine.  
TECOM’s mission is “to develop, coordinate, resource, execute, and evaluate training 
and education concepts, policies, plans, and programs to ensure Marines are prepared to 
meet the challenges of present and future operational environments.”  
(http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/)   
MAGTFTC’s (of Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, 
California) mission is to develop, conduct, and administer the Combined Arms Training 
Program.  (www.29palms.usmc.mil)  Emphasis on developing concepts is readily 
apparent in the joint efforts of MAGTFTC and TECOM in studying the options and 
requirements for construction of a large-scale Military Operations in Urban Terrain 
(MOUT) facility.  MAGTFTC has begun constructing the USMC Urban Warfare 
Training Center in order to enhance urban training significantly throughout the Marine 
Corps.  (Statement by Brigadier General Joseph F. Weber to the House Armed Services 
Committee, 2002)  Operations officer for MOUT Training at 29 Palms, Col James Seaton 
III, says “We’re trying to help blend what’s worked very well in the past … to make it 
(MOUT training) more realistic.”  (Mega MOUT, 2005)  
Marines gain experience for urban engagements in pre-deployment MOUT 
training.  Many combat-experienced Marines from Iraq noted the difference between the 
Marine Corps’ relatively simple and limited MOUT training facilities and the actual 
urban environment encountered in Iraq.  This perceived difference has gained the interest 
of Brigadier General Zlimer, Commanding General, MAGTFTC, and he has requested an 
exploration of the issue. 
The research goals are to evaluate the applicability of the DO Platoon to urban 
combat; explore the comparable effect of real-world terrain to the USMC Urban Warfare 
Training Center MOUT facility; and to gain valuable training insights for application to 




Battles have and will potentially be fought on a vast number of urban terrains.  
There are also immense permutations of tactics, assaulting forces, enemy dispositions, 
and arrangement of non-combatants that could be experienced in an urban environment.  
This thesis focuses on two different assaulting platoon types, two specific urban terrains, 
a single tactic for each terrain, an identical attachment of supporting arms, a single enemy 
disposition for each terrain and a single non-combatant presence.  The modeling 
environment adds a stochastic element to the placement and actions of the agents so no 
two runs are identical.  This creates comparable urban operating environments to 
generate numerous data points that represent a wide range of possible outcomes of 
employing the DO or Traditional Platoons.  In all, there are four vignettes: DO Platoon 
on Fallujah Terrain; Traditional Platoon on Fallujah Terrain; DO Platoon in a MOUT 
facility; Traditional Platoon in a MOUT facility. 
This analysis concentrates on an infantry platoon with attachments assaulting an 
area of urban terrain defended by insurgent forces with a noncombatant presence.  
Doctrine, unclassified reports, and real-world accounts were used to the maximum extent 
possible to define the scenarios and behaviors in the models.  In the absence of 
information and data, experts and personal experience were used to create reasonable 
elements of the model.  The desire to have the product remain unclassified resulted in a 
large amount of the information gathered from newsprint posted online, books, and 
articles by reputable authors with acknowledged combat experience, and websites of the 
USMC and GlobalSecurity.org.  Works are cited in the text, and a complete reference list 
is provided at the end of the document.  Joint Publications, CompanyCommander.com, 
Service Publications, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Defense 
Planning Guidance, and concept papers have influenced the development of ideas and 
even though not directly cited are indirectly responsible for the germination of some 
ideas contained in this thesis.   
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Much of the foundation of this research is based upon USMC doctrine and 
concepts under development.  Specifics are provided in Chapters III and IV, but in 
summary: 
• The structure for the Traditional Platoon, attachments, capabilities and 
basic assault tactics are from USMC doctrine.   
• The DO Platoon structure and capabilities are based upon the concepts 
developed by MCWL in its Distributed Operations 2006 Capabilities 
and Enhancements Report. 
• Terrain for the section of the Jolan District, Fallujah, Iraq is adapted 
from National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) satellite imagery. 
• Terrain for the MOUT terrain is adapted from site photography and 
schematic plans for the MAGTFTC Urban Warfare Training Center, 
Range 200, MOUT Training Facility, Twentynine Palms, Ca.   
• Insurgent structure and behaviors are from news and first-hand reports 
of the events in Operation al-Fajr, November 2004. 
• Non-combatant presence is in line with news and first-hand reports of 
the events in Operation al-Fajr, November 2004. 
• Weapons are modeled after manufacturer specification of capabilities 
and interpolation of applicable probabilities to hit within the geographic 




The remaining portion of the thesis is organized into the following chapters: 
• Chapter II: Background:  This chapter identifies the elements of the 
problem being addressed and how a simulation model of urban combat 
at the platoon level can assist in evaluating DO.  The section also 
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includes a brief summary of Operation al-Fajr and its importance to the 
approach used in developing this research.   
• Chapter III: Scenarios:  This chapter delves into the details of each of the 
four scenarios. 
• Chapter IV: Model Development:  The development of the terrain, 
agents, and weapons in the model is discussed.   
• Chapter V: Analysis Methodology:  The Design of Experiment (DOE) is 
explained along with the reasoning that led to the data generation.  This 
chapter discusses the reasons these methods are appropriate for 
evaluating the applicability of DO in urban combat and the Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs).  The survey of Marines with combat experience 
is presented.    
• Chapter VI: Data and Data Analysis:  The data are summarized, the 
analysis tools are introduced, and an analysis is performed using data 
plots, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and regression trees. 
• Chapter VII: Findings, Insights and Conclusion:  Specific findings and 
insights from the analysis are presented.   
• Chapter VIII: Recommendations for Future Studies:  This chapter briefly 
discusses future research opportunities based upon the current work and 
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II. BACKGROUND 
If there is an enemy out there that wants to make a difference, he can only 
make a difference by getting us into a complex, chaotic, deadly 
environment that negates our technology, negates our strength, and 
capitalizes on their strengths.  That place is called the cities. 
—General Charles Krulak, 31st Commandant, USMC  
 
A. CITY STREETS: BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE  
 
As the above quote indicates, future battles will likely ensue on the city streets 
than on the conventional terrains of the past.  Mogadishu, Somalia, Grozny, Chechnya, 
and Fallujah, Iraq were urban battles that might foreshadow future modern warfare.  Such 
battles provided the unstable mix of urbanization, a history of political, social and ethnic 
unrest, and population growth to set the stage for conflict.   
An urban environment represents a problem for America’s Armed Forces, who 
have a long tradition of battling in the jungles, deserts, fields, forests and on beaches.  US 
forces may have some experience in urban combat, but only on a limited basis compared 
to the overall theater of operations in past wars.  Experiences in Seoul, Hue City, Beirut, 
Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Iraq have demonstrated a shift in US military 
operations from the open country to the tangled streets of small villages and large cities.1  







1 Those wishing to further examine these and other historic urban conflicts are referred to a well 
written collection of urban conflict case studies in the book: Soldiers In Cities: Military Operations On 
Urban Terrain by Michael C. Desch (2001) (ISBN 1-58487-062-1).   
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ONE-HUNDRED YEARS OF CITIES CONTESTED IN CONFLICT 
  RIGA           1917 * SEOUL             1950  ZAHLE 1981 
  MADRID         1936   BUDAPEST          1956  TYRE 1982 
  WARSAW         1939 * BEIRUT            1958 * BEIRUT 1983 
  ROTTERDAM      1940 * SANTO DOMINGO     1965 * PANAMA CITY 1989-1990 
  MOSCOW         1942   JERUSALEM 1967 * COLON 1989-1990 
  STALINGRAD     1942 * SAIGON            1968 * KUWAIT CITY 1991 
  LENINGRAD      1942 * KONTUM            1968  SARAJEVO 1991-1992 
  WARSAW         1943 * HUE               1968 * MOGADISHU 1993 
* PALERMO        1944   BELFAST           1972 * BOSNIA 1994 
* BREST          1944   MONTEVIDEO        1972  GROZNY 1994-1995 
  WARSAW         1944   QUANGTRI CITY     1972 * KOSOVO 1999 
* AACHEN         1944   AN LOC            1972  BELGRADE 1999 
  ORTONA         1944   SUEZ CITY 1973 * BAGHDAD 2003 
* CHERBOURG      1944   XUAN LOC          1975 * MOSUL 2004 
  BRESLAU        1945   SAIGON            1975 * RAMADI 2004 
* WEISSENFELS    1945   TEL ZAATAR 1976 * FALLUJAH 2004 
  BERLIN         1945 * BEIRUT            1975-1978 
* MANILA            1945   MANAGUA 1978 
* SAN MANUEL        1945   KHORRAGHAR 1980 
'*' indicates direct US troop 
involvement 
 
Table 1. One-hundred Years of Urban Combat 
 
Anthony Tether, Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), said,  
 Urban operations are the most dangerous, costly and chaotic form of 
combat … America’s enemies are moving from the open battlefield to the 
urban centers.  More combat is likely to take place in cities and towns, 
rather than in open desert, fields, forests or jungles.  (French, 2004) 
Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf expresses the same message.  In his 
autobiography, It Doesn't Take a Hero: 
I am quite confident that in the foreseeable future armed conflict will not 
take the form of huge land armies facing each other across extended battle 
lines on the field of battle.  Conflict in the future will be similar to that 
which we have seen in the recent past.  Both of the military operations in 
which we were involved with in the Middle East were the result of 
regional conflicts that grew to proportions that began to impact the rest of 
the world.  Such dangerous regional conflicts will be with us for years to 
come.  Any one of them could lead us to war.  (Schwarzkopf, 1992) 
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The United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization (WHO) emphasize 
the increased potential for the conditions leading to urban conflict.  These organizations 
agree that the world’s population is increasing and becoming more urbanized every day.  
The WHO projects the urban proportion of the world’s six billion people will steadily 
increase (Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment, 2002.)  The UN predicts the 
urban ratio to exceed the 50 percent mark by 2007, “thus marking the first time in history 
that the world will have more urban residents than rural residents.”  (UN Press Release, 
2004)  The WHO and UN agree that almost all the growth of the world’s total population 
between 2000 and beyond will likely occur in developing nations in Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  This will drive the proportion of the world’s population of 
urban dwellers to 61 percent by 2030.  It is no coincidence that countries in these regions 
top the advisory lists of our State Department and Energy Department.  These two 
departments post the lists on their public service websites in order to provide traveler and 
business warnings.  The link between urban growth and potential for conflict appears 
plausible. 
Why would the enemy choose to skirmish in the streets?  Many agencies and 
elements of the defense community have noted “the most obvious conclusion is that no 
nation today can directly challenge US conventional military strength, and it would be 
folly to try─a lesson our potential foes are certain to have learned.”  (Skelton, 2000)  
These foes will seek to defeat or repel the US, and to that end will attempt to capitalize 
on the principles of asymmetric warfare.  The enemy will draw the fight into streets and 
terrain that he intimately knows, will use the US rules of engagement for his gain, and 
will involve the civilian population as either shields or as an empowering force.  
(Newton, 2004)  In future conflict, the USMC will likely be fighting on enemy territory 
where the defenders have rehearsed and where a civilian population could hinder or help 
either side of the conflict. 
A war in an urban environment could reduce or eliminate the US technology 
edge.  Experience shows radios do not work well amid the concrete and steel structures of 
a city.  Technology has not yet enabled troops to see inside or around buildings or to peer 




Figure 1.   Complexity of Urban Environment   
(After MCWP 3-25.3 p 1-4.) 
 
The urban battlefield is a highly complex environment, generating many more 
concerns beyond just engaging the enemy.  General Krulak noted, 
In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing 
displaced refugees—providing humanitarian assistance.  In the next 
moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting 
peacekeeping operations.  Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal 
mid-intensity battle.  All in the same day, all within three city blocks.  It 
will be called the three-block war. 
Colonel John Toolan, USMC, observed in the Operation al-Fajr, that the three-
block war scenario occurred immediately upon entry to the battlefield, and commonly in 
the span of a single block, not three. 
The strategic and tactical motivations for the conduct of urban combat is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but the following excerpt from GlobalSecrutriy.org  places the 
subject in the proper context.  
Urban combat operations may be conducted in order to capitalize on the 
strategic or tactical advantages which possession or control of a particular 
urban area gives or to deny these advantages to the enemy.  Major urban 
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areas represent the power and wealth of a particular country in the form of 
industrial bases, transportation complexes, economic institutions, and 
political and cultural centers.  The denial or capture of these centers may 
yield decisive psychological advantages that frequently determine the 
success or failure of the larger conflict. 
 
B. DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS: FORCE OF THE FUTURE 
 
I'm committed to building a future force that is defined less by size and 
more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, 
one that relies more heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and 
information technologies. 
—President George W. Bush 
 
Transforming today’s military force is a priority for the President, the Secretary of 
Defense, and the USMC Commandant.  The evolution of a future force has been 
emphasized not only in service-specific vision statements, but also in the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) Transformation Planning Guidance. 
Distributed Operations (DO) is transformational, but not a novel concept.  It is a 
natural evolution of the DoD and USMC concept of warfare.  DO seeks to further 
“develop the capability to deploy tactical units across the depth and breadth of a battle 
space in order to maximize opportunities to achieve favorable intelligence driven 
engagements.”  (Distributed Operations 2006, 2004)  Technology has generated new 
capabilities, new possibilities, and new challenges.  DO is the USMC’s effort to 
incorporate the technological edge into its warrior ethos and to transform the concepts to 
doctrine. 
A basic assumption of the continuing Sea Viking 2006 exercise program is that 
the Marine Corps of the future will continue to fight as a combined-arms, integrated 
force.  DO units will have the ability to operate in a distributed and networked manner 
against both traditional and future emerging asymmetric threats.  (Goulding, 2004)  The 
DO skill set is a capability sorely needed in the USMC combat arsenal. 
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The 33rd USMC Commandant, General Hagee, has set the course to ensure the 
USMC remains a key component of the joint forces.  The DO element is one part of the 
USMC’s goals to transform the Corps by melding technological enhancements with 
decades of successful combat experience.  General Hagee, who officially approved 
development of the DO concept in MARADMIN 303/05 July 23, 2005, envisions DO as 
an operational concept to allow small networked units to perform independently in the 
battle space of the future.  (Navy League Almanac, 2005) 
The DO Platoon will be composed of networked units that are dispersed over an 
extended battle space.  The key characteristics entail operating in a decentralized manner, 
independently addressing multidimensional situations, and maintaining disruptive 
pressure on an adversary’s entire system in a join environment.  The DO concept is 
proposed for squad to battalion-sized MAGTF units for a full range of military 
operations.  The DO units will be valuable because their non-linear, non-sequential 
manner of operation is much more difficult to predict than traditional forces.  Their 
decentralized means of command and control brings decision-making down to the small 
unit leader level, the fire team, and squad leader.  The decision-making at this level 
exploits human capital and agility and accelerates the operational speed and tempo of 
operations.  (Shmiddle and Hoffman, 2004)  Brigadier General Schmidle asserts that DO 
is an additional capability that will allow the Marine Corps to operate 
effectively on today's multi-dimensional battlefield.  This is not really a 
change in mission.  DO will complement our conventional capabilities and 
allow us to better accomplish our tasks. 
 
C. THIRD BATTALION, 1ST MARINE DIVISION IN FALLUJAH 
 
The Third Battalion, 1st Marine Division (3/1) was instrumental in the battle of al-
Fajr.  The efforts of those brave Marines liberated a city held hostage by lawless 
insurgents.  The events of November 2004 and the efforts of the Thundering Third serve 
as the foundation of the scenarios. 
In order to ground the analysis in reality, a portion of the events of Operation al-
Fajr serves as the baseline model.  The operation to regain control of Fallujah, named 
Operation al-Fajr (Arabic for Dawn), began on 08 Nov 2004.  From the initiation of the 
assault until the declared end of major operations six days later, US and Iraqi national 
forces fought insurgent forces in what is considered the “biggest urban assault by United 
States’ forces since Vietnam.”  (Battle for Fallujah, 2004)  The purpose of the assault was 
to destroy the insurgent forces occupying the city. 
The assault forces were composed of 6,000 US troops in four Marine battalions 
(3/1, 1/3, 3/5, 1/8) and two US Army mechanized battalions, 2,000 Iraqi troops, as well 
as attack aircraft and several Marine and Army artillery battalions.  (Keiler, 2005)  The 
assault is depicted in Figure 2 and in Appendix D. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Events of Operation al-Fajr   
(From Harnden, Nov 2004) 
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The 3/1 was the penetration force in the city and attacked the core of the enemy’s 
defense.  The Marines conducted house-to-house clearing of the area and the fighting was 
arduous against rocket-propelled-grenades, AK-47’s, grenades, IEDs, and an enemy who 
had the area targeted with mortars.  (Keiler, 2005)  A six-hour portion of the battle 
conducted in the Jolan District, set a few hours after “A-Hour,” serves as the baseline of 
the simulation.  “In the northwestern area of the city, US troops advanced slowly after 
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dusk on the Jolan neighborhood, a warren of alleyways where Sunni militants had dug 
in.”  (Krane, 2004) 
Although records and statistics for any single platoon in the operation do not exist 
in an unclassified form, news reports and web postings provide insight and figures by 
which one can gauge the accuracy of the model.  Events occurring in the model are based 
upon doctrine instead of actual events.   
Again, it is important to emphasize that the reported casualty statistics cannot tie 
directly to any particular platoon or platoons, so the casualty figures for Operation al-Fajr 
serve only as a benchmark.  They allow one to compare the model’s casualty numbers to 
the results of the first three days of fighting when 18 US troops were killed and 69 
wounded.  Total US casualties in Operation al-Fajr were 51 killed and 425 seriously 
wounded.  As many as 1,200 insurgents were reported killed.  (Kelly, 2004)  The actual 
battle is akin to a single trial of an experiment, and as such, no determination as to 
whether the results are a maximum, minimum, mean, median or extreme outlier is 
possible.  Another complicating factor is casualty reporting in times of war is often 
intentionally delayed in order to misinform the enemy and to erode the morale of an 
opposing force. 
The baseline model is a hypothetical rendition of the events of six hours in the 
urban combat across a particular tract of terrain in the Jolan District, Fallujah, Iraq.  The 
timeline has this particular area being assaulted during the night.  The model is not 
intended to portray the exact events of the combat.  What is reflected is hypothetical.  
From the basic model, extrapolations are possible. 
 
D. MAGTFTC MOUT FACILITY  
 
MAGTFTC has been refining the concept of Combined-Arms MOUT in order to 
provide a realistic environment to ensure Marines can be prepared for deployment and 
maneuver in an urban environment.  MAGTFTC has begun construction of a $304  
million training facility that encompasses live fire, joint fire, and large-scale urban 
evolutions in realistic urban conditions.  Figure 3 shows the detailed planning and design 
of the facility.   
 
Figure 3.   Illustration of Urban Canyon in MAGTFTC MOUT Facility 
 (From FACD Final Report, May2005) 
 
A portion of the facility will serve as a basis for the second terrain modeled.  The 
complete facility will comprise five major functional components: Primary Town, 
Indirect Live-Fire Facility, Residential Village, Port/Industrial Complex, and Airfield 
Complex.  The areas will have over 1,800 buildings and will be a combination of live-fire 
and non-live-fire locations.  Range 200 is a recently completed portion of the non-live-
fire training area and is designed to be representative of an urban desert community 
consisting of 100 structures, complete with underground tunnels and electrical lighting.  
Rage 200’s layout (185 meters by 165 meters) serves as the MOUT terrain in the 
simulation.  Figure 4 is a current photograph of Range 200 of the MOUT facility. 
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III. SCENARIOS 
We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the 
worst threats before they emerge. 




The previous chapters presented the motivation and background for the model 
development.  The following section is a comprehensive overview of the four modeled 
scenarios.  The terrain is the principal aspect of the scenarios, either Fallujah or MOUT, 
and is detailed in the first section.  The scenarios are then subdivided according to the 
type of assault force, DO Platoon, or Traditional Platoon.  Summaries of the force types 
are also provided.  The result is four distinct scenarios, but all are based upon a common 
theme.  The intent is to allow the reader to understand what is simulated.  Principal 
elements shared by each of the scenarios are presented in Operation Order (OPORD) 
format in order to convey the concepts clearly.  Additional guidance on the content of the 
OPORD can be found in Appendix E, which is based upon FMFRP 0-6, Marine Troop 
Leader's Guide and Joint Publication 1-03.8. 
The OPORD is a core part of the training every USMC officer receives from The 
Basic School, Quantico, Virginia, directly after commissioning.  The content of the 
OPORD, also known as “The Five Paragraph Order,” is recalled using the acronym 
SMEAC (Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, Command and 
Signal).  “SMEAC deals with every order that is given.  It ensures that the orders that are 
given are able to be accomplished.”  (Joint Publication 1-03.8) Terrain and the force of 
the OPORD are provided in the preface to the OPORD.  The remainder of the chapter 
explores the doctrinal convention and advances sequentially from Terrain, to Assault 






1. Significance of the Terrain 
 
Terrain impacts our maneuver and influences our tactical dispositions. We 
must understand terrain and comprehend its effects, as it may limit our 
movement, reduce our visibility, or restrict our fires. 
—MCDP 1-3: Tactics 
Encyclopedia Britannica notes that tactics are dependent and driven by the terrain 
on which a battle is fought and states: 
Land warfare … unfolds over concrete terrain, including roads, passages, 
elevated ground, cover, and obstacles of every kind.  Victory goes to him 
who best understands and utilizes the terrain. 
For this reason, the principal characteristics of each scenario are based upon the 
terrain.  Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), 1995, Vol. FM 3-06.11 
recommends the assigned frontage for the attacks of an urban area be based upon the size 
and layout of buildings and the anticipated enemy resistance.  This manual also 
recommends a typical company normally attack on a one-to-two block front.  In the 
doctrinal context, a city block is considered to be approximately 175 meters wide, so a 
range of 175 to 350 meters is acceptable for a company-sized assault.  Anticipating 
higher enemy resistance indicates that a frontage closer to 175 meters is more 
appropriate.   
 
2. Jolan District, Fallujah, Iraq Terrain 
 
The Jolan District of Fallujah was chosen as a terrain due to the data available 
from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Divisions (3/1) assault there in November of 2004.  
Fallujah is unlike any city in which Marines have ever trained.  The city is located forty 
miles west of Baghdad and measures three kilometers wide along an east-west axis and 
three and a half kilometers along a north-south axis.  The city is home to an estimated 
250,000 to 300,000 residents who live and work in an estimated 50,000 buildings. The 
layout of the city is random, especially the Jolan district, which is the oldest section of the 
city and is criss-crossed with twisted, narrow streets and alleys.  Zoning that distinguishes 
between residential, business, and industrial is non-existent.  (Catagnus, Edison, Keeling, 
and Moon, 2005)  For this research, the full city is too large to model in its entirety, at the 
current model resolution and within the available time.  Figures 5 and 6 provide a 
glimpse of the complexity of the urban terrain in Fallujah. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Combat Photo Collage of the Complex Urban Environment of Iraq 
 (Photo Credit: LtCol Norm Root, USMC) 
 
Figure 6.   Marines in Positions along a Narrow Street in Fallujah   
(Photo Credit: Luis Sinco─Los Angeles Times) 
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The Pentagon had a block-by-block schematic of the city prior to the assault.  It 
also had daily intelligence reports of where insurgents were living and where they were 
building their operational plans.  This knowledge and imagery allowed US forces to plan 
their actions on real-time and real-world information of where they would fight.  
(Scarborough and Gertz, 2004) 
The Jolan District terrain modeled is 185 meters along the east-west axis and 165 
meters along the north south axis.  The area contains 91 buildings and is an appropriate 
frontage for the modeled Marine force due to the significant enemy resistance expected 
and their great resolve.  Figure 7 provides a visual of the process employed to locate the 
modeled area of interest in the Jolan District of Fallujah, Iraq. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Satellite Imagery Transition to Modeled Section of Jolan District 




General characteristics of the Jolan District terrain in the model are 
• Observation and fields of fire are extremely limited due to the 
positioning of urban structures as well as the presence of palm trees, 
destroyed vehicles, rubble from damaged structures, crumbled 
outbuildings and fallen courtyard walls.  (Krane, 2004)   Figure 8 
illustrates sight restrictions that exist in the urban Iraqi environment. 
 
 
Figure 8.   1st Division Marines on the Move in Western Fallujah  
(Photo Credit: Associated Press)  
 
• Cover protects combatants from weapon fire.  Concealment protects 
combatants from observation.  Cover and concealment are minimal or 
nonexistent in the streets.  “The streets are narrow and are generally 
lined by walls.  The walls canalize the squad and do not allow for 
standard immediate action drills when contact is made.”  The level of 
cover and concealment increases in the regions around structures.  
“Almost all houses have an enclosed courtyard” with many obstacles 
created by the preparatory bombing of the area.  Cover and concealment 
are at a maximum within buildings where exterior windows are barred 
and covered with blinds or cardboard and the walls of the houses “are all 
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made of brick with a thick covering of mortar overtop.”  (Catagnus, 
Edison, Keeling, and Moon, 2005) 
• There is no dominant key terrain in the zone modeled, but the enemy has 
built manmade obstacles to reinforce their defenses, to canalize and to 
impede the assault. 
• Avenues of approach are significantly increased in an urban 
environment and can be considered possible in all directions, even 
vertically.  All walls can be breached, but breaching movement, though 
often preferred, is considerable slower than using normal entrances.  The 
slower speed of a breach entry yields increased safety for the assaulting 
Marines.  The choice made at every structure is to breach a wall slowly 
or to attack through a potentially booby-trapped door or window.  
(Catagnus, Edison, Keeling, and Moon, 2005) 
• Movement rates are quickest for dismounted troops in the streets, slower 
in the areas outside of structures, even slower within structures, and 
slowest when breaching walls.    
• Visibility is reduced due to the events in the scenarios occurring during 
the night.  The urban terrain is 185 meters wide by 165 meters deep and 
contains 96 buildings. 
• Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) will likely be located in the streets, 
around and in buildings. 
 
3. MOUT Training Facility Terrain  
 
Marines gained experience in urban engagements prior to Fallujah through pre-
deployment MOUT training.  Many Marines noted the difference between the Marine 
Corps’ relatively simple and limited MOUT training facilities and the actual urban 
environment encountered in Iraq.  Colonel Philip J. Exner, USMC, cited the finding in 
the Summary Report of USMC Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation 
Enduring Freedom, Jan 2004.  Conclusive evidence was also corroborated by a survey of 
the perceptions of 251 Marines who had recent urban combat experience in Iraq.  As far 
back as February 25, 2000, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) National 
Security and International Affairs Division published the report: “Military Capabilities—
Focused Attention Needed to Prepare US Forces for Combat in Urban Areas,” noting 
training MOUT facilities were not adequate to train for the type of urban battle Marines 
would actually experience.  The same issues are restated in the report “GAO-05-534 
Military Training,” released in June 2005. 
General characteristics of the MOUT terrain in the model are similar to the 
Fallujah terrain.  Figures 9 and 10 give different views of the Range 200 facility. 
 
 




Figure 10.   Range 200 Twentynine Palms, Ca (Photo Credit: Babilot) 
In dimensions, the MOUT facility terrain is equivalent to the Fallujah Terrain 
(185 meters wide by 165 meters deep) and has approximately the same number of 
structures (100 buildings).  Figure 11 shows how the MOUT facility was translated into 
the basis for the MOUT terrain in the model.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Layout of Range 200 MOUT Facility (MAGTFTC) 
 
C. ASSAULT FORCES 
 
1. Basic Elements of the Assault Force 
 
A Traditional Platoon has the same number of members as a DO Platoon (44 
total).  The structure and equipment vary, and the DO Platoon has additional training.  
Tactics are driven by the urban terrain.  Therefore, in the model, tactics employed by 
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each platoon are the same, but modified slightly to accommodate the two different 
terrains (the Fallujah and the Twentynine Palms MOUT site). 
The basis of the tactics is that during house-to-house clearing attacks squads are 
to minimize their exposure in the streets.  In the model, each fire team of a squad is 
assigned one of three missions: assault; support; or security.  (Catagnus, Edison, Keeling, 
and Moon,2005)  Figure 12 illustrates how a squad could be divided to satisfy the three 
missions.  
 
Assault Element:  
    Physically secures the building and  
           engages the enemy 
Support Element:  
    Delivers neutralizing and supporting fires 
Security Element:  
    Supports assault force with fire and  
           isolates the objective 
Figure 12.   Breakdown of Responsibilities of Squad Teams 
(After CALL Newsletter 99-10: Urban Combat Operation) 
 
The amount of terrain for which units are responsible in the scenario is credible in 
that squads in Fallujah were tasked with clearing a lane that might have contained up to 
sixty houses.  The model has each squad assaulting less than 60 structures. 
 
a. Traditional Platoon 
 
The structure and capabilities of the Traditional Platoon are based upon 
current Marine Corps doctrine.  (FMFM 6-4 Marine Rifle Company/Platoon)  Key details 
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of the modeled characteristics and capabilities are explained in the next chapter: “IV 
Model Development.”   
 
b. DO Platoon  
 
The structure and capabilities of the DO Platoon are based upon the 
content of the draft report: “Distributed Operations 2006 Capabilities and Enhancements 
Report,” from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, released 19 Jan 2005.  A DO 
Platoon has a modified structure, an expanded communications package, enhanced 
optics, and increased training.  The details of the modeled characteristics and capabilities 
are explained in the next chapter: “IV Model Development.”  The differences in the 
structure of the two platoons are readily apparent in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Comparison of Traditional Platoon Organization to a DO Platoon 
(After DO Capabilities, 2004) 
 
D. OPERATION ORDER  
 
The scenario is based on the actions of a platoon with attachments in urban 
combat.  The OPORD is given from the perspective of 1st Platoon, A Company, 3/1, 
which acts as A Company’s main effort.  The remainder of the company plays roles in 
support of the 1st Platoon.  What follows is not the actual OPORD of Operation al-Fajr, 





Insurgent forces, who oppose free elections for the formulation of a legitimate and 
independent Iraqi government, have control of Fallujah.  Their methods are terror and 
violence.  The insurgent forces use Fallujah as a safe haven where the lawless can operate 
bomb factories, torture and behead hostages, rearm, refresh and regroup between actions, 
and to plan operations to disrupt activity throughout the whole of Iraq.  Four contractors 
were publicly killed in Fallujah and the forces in control of the city, who consider 
themselves above the rule of law, support the perpetrators.  The insurgents are aware of 
the pending US assault, but do not know the details of when or how.  Ongoing US 
military operations in the area have served to deceive and confuse the enemy in regards 
to the true military intentions.  The civilian population has heeded notification of the 
forthcoming attack and has mostly evacuated the city.  The assault has the support of the 
new Iraqi government.  Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi has authorized the assault, 
declared a round-the-clock curfew in Fallujah, and said, “The people of Fallujah have 
been taken hostage ... and you need to free them from their grip.”  (Krane, 2004) 
 
a.  Enemy Forces  
 
The insurgents are both brutal and fanatic.  Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 
has said insurgents would likely provide staunch opposition.  He is quoted as saying 
Listen, these folks are determined.  These are killers.  They chop people's 
heads off.  They're getting money from around the world.  They're getting 
recruits.  (Krane, 2004) 
There is an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 insurgents in the city.  (Johnston, 
2005) The area of assigned terrain may contain up to a platoon-sized force of insurgents.   
The opposing forces are believed to consist of poorly trained Iraqi 
nationals, foreign fighters, and members of Saddam Hussein's demobilized army.  The 
enemy has shown a propensity to learn and to adapt to tactics.  Their adaptability is 
exemplified in the way the insurgents negated the US’s preference to fight in the dark 
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using night-vision equipment by focusing their attacks in the dim light of dawn and dusk.  
(Ware, 2004)  The opposition can be classified into two types of forces: Guerrillas and 
the Martyrs.  Guerrillas will only engage on terrain of their choosing, in possession of the 
tactical advantage, will seek to kill many Marines quickly, and will then seek to evade 
along a preplanned obscured route in order to fight another day.  The Martyrs will likely 
be in fortified fighting positions in houses and will lie in wait and attempt to kill as many 
Marines as possible in a fight to their deaths.  (Catagnus, Edison, Keeling, Moon, 2005) 
The insurgents probably have an “outer-crust defense”, which consists of a 
sparsely manned interior zone with the propensity of their forces creating a defense-in-
depth from the perimeter to the edge of the interior zone (e.g., all insurgents will be 
spread in the depth of the battlefield, not lined up on the fringe, as is common with a 
perimeter defense).  The enemy is prepared to defend in any direction and has been 
observed hardening its defenses.  On contact, the enemy will either attrite Marine forces 
and then withdraw (to regroup for counter attack or to set-up an ambush) or will fight to 
their death.  (Scarborough and Gertz, 2004 and Harnden, 2004)  The enemy will operate 
in three- to six-person teams.  (Spinner, Vick and Fekeiki, 2004) 
The insurgents’ weapons are small arms, like the AK-47, grenades, rocket 
propelled grenades (RPG’s), heavy machine guns, and anti-air machine guns.  Over 300 
weapons caches are estimated to be in the city, so the enemy is consider well armed.  The 
enemy’s obscured evasion routes are suspected to link weapons caches and to be well 
rehearsed.  The enemy has a history of using improvised explosive devices to disrupt 
assault momentum, to initiate ambushes, and to cover their escape. 
 
b.  Friendly Forces 
 
Higher Headquarters:  US Forces will penetrate the city from the north and 
sweep south in order to destroy the insurgent presence to regain control of the city in 
preparation for national elections scheduled for Jan 2005.  The 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine 
Division (3/1), has been assigned the western sector of Fallujah (specifically the Jolan 
District), as an avenue of assault in Operation al-Fajr, with the intent of eradicating the 
31 
insurgent’s presence in the zone.  The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry (2/7) will be conducting 
a parallel north-to-south assault on the eastern flank of 3/1 through the center of the city. 
Adjacent commands: B Company, 3/1, will be conducting a parallel north-
to-south assault along the territory near the west flank of the grid.  C Company (2/7) will 
be conducting a parallel north-to-south assault along the territory near the east flank of 
the grid. 
 Supporting units: The 2nd Platoon, A Company, 3/1, will have the zone 
condoned off in order to isolate the enemy forces and to destroy retreating forces.  
Weapons Platoon will provide attachments to support the 1st Platoon, 2nd Platoons and 3rd 
Platoon’s efforts.  The 3rd Platoon will remain deployed in the assembly area and serve as 
the reserve force, enemy prisoner of war (EPW) processor, and recovery force for Marine 
casualties. 
 
2.  Mission 
 
At H-hour, the 1st Platoon will perform a dismounted tactical assault to clear the 
assigned urban zone of insurgent forces in order to reinstate law and order and to ensure a 
safe environment for the return of the civilian population.   
 
3.  Execution 
 
a. Commander's Intent 
 
 The assaulting force will perform a house-to-house clearing of the zone in 
order to seek out and to destroy enemy bunkers and weapons catches.  The assaulting 
force will fully comply with the Laws of War.  The forces are directed to minimize non-
combatant casualties to the greatest extent possible without jeopardizing the safety of 
Marines.  The 24-hour curfew and the voluntary evacuation of civilians from the city 
deem hostile actions of any type as justification for an armed response.  Carrying or 
seeking to retrieve fallen weapons is a hostile action.  “Rules of engagement: Real simple 
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—if someone points a weapon at you —kill 'em, if you see anyone with an RPG …—kill 
'em."  (Harp, 2004)  We intend to destroy the insurgent forces in order to liberate Fallujah 
while upholding the Law of War.  Even in war, the safety of Marines is paramount.  
Small unit leaders are empowered to decide the proper level of response when under fire 
from structures within their zone of responsibility, to include mosques used in violation 
of the rules of armed conflict. 
 
b.  Concept of Operations 
 
The 1st Platoon will assault from assigned urban zone from phase line 
NORTH to phase line SOUTH.  Every structure will be cleared of insurgents, weapons, 
weapons catches, and fortified bunkers.  Squads will have assigned lanes.  Forces will 
move at the fastest rate possible to clear the zone with a minimum of US casualties.  The 
assault will occur at H-hour at the crossing of phase line NORTH.  The execution will 
occur during darkness.  The assault phase will be complete with consolidation of forces at 
phase line SOUTH at approximately H+6 hours.  Battalion indirect fire missions will be 




The 1st Squad will be the main effort.  Their assigned region is the central 
north-to-south band of the region.  The east and west flank structures are to be 
coordinated with the 2nd and 3rd Squads.   
The 2nd Squad will support the west flank of the 1st Squad.  Their assigned 
region is the western north-to-south band of the region.  The east flank structures are to 
be coordinated with the 1st Squad. 
The 3rd Squad will support the east flank of the 1st Squad.  Their assigned 
region is the eastern north-to-south band of the region.  The west flank structures are to 
be coordinated with the 1st Squad. 
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Weapons Attachment (Machine Gun Team 1 and 2, Shoulder Launched 
Multipurpose Assault Weapon [SMAW] Team 1 and 2 and Sniper Team 1) will support 
the forward movement of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Squads. 
Reconnaissance Team 1 will be inserted into the zone at H-1 hour and 
provide forward surveillance of enemy forces in the area to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Squad. 
 
d.  Reserve 
 
The 3rd Platoon, Company A, 3/1, will remain deployed in the assembly 
area and serve as the reserve force and will evacuate wounded Marines and escort enemy 
prisoners of war in accordance with battalion SOP. 
 
e.  Coordinating Instructions  
 
The scheduled time of execution is H-hour on D-day.  This order is 
effective immediately for planning. 
 
4.  Administration and Logistics 
  
Forces will deploy with a full complement of rations and ammunition.  Resupply 
is planned following consolidation at phase line SOUTH.  EPW’s will be handled 
according to battalion SOP and transferred to the 3rd Platoon.  Casualties are to be 
reported to the 3rd Platoon for immediate aid and evacuation to Battalion Aid Station 1.  
Civil population and refugees are to be advised of curfew and to stay indoors and to lie 
on the floors of their structures. 
 
5. Command and Signal 
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IV. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Often there is a gap between principles and actual events that cannot 
always be bridged by a succession of logical deductions.  
—Clausewitz  
 
The previous sections have provided a foundation for the development of the 
models.  The reader should have a firm grasp of not only the motivation but also the 
scope of the scenarios modeled.  The following chapter briefly introduces the modeling 
environment and the approach taken to create the elements of the simulation  
(i.e., Terrain and Forces).  The overview is a broad overview of the model creation. 
Additional detail along with explicit MANA settings is provided in Appendix H.  An in-
depth explanation and a hands-on tutorial can be found in the MANA Users Manual 
(Lauren and Stephen, 2002), which can be requested by email from 
D.Galligan@dta.mil.nz.   
 
A. DATA SOURCES 
 
A broad literature review has set the stage for the research contain herein.  
Specifics of force structures and capabilities are derived from USMC doctrine wherever 
possible.  In the absence of doctrine, reliable public sources (e.g., books, websites, 
newsprint and unclassified reports) are referenced.  In the absence of substantive public 
sources, expert opinions were sought from colleagues.  Additionally, the author made 
decisions and drew conclusions based upon 10 years of USMC experience.  Sources of 







B. AGENT-BASED MODELING ENVIRONMENT: MAP AWARE NON-




Map-Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) was designed by the Operational 
Analysis Section of the New Zealand Defence Technology Agency (DTA) and belongs to 
the ABM class of models.  MANA has been created to model human nature and capture 
interactions among agents and their environment.  The environment creates a discrete-
step simulation with event-triggered agent states.  (Lauren and Stephen, 2002) 
MANA is intended as a self-describing name: 
• Map Aware: The moving parts in the model (the agents) are aware of 
their local surroundings, the ground features, and the events that occur 
around them on the battlefield.   
• Non-Uniform:  The agents can be a range of different actors on the 
battle, from people to aircraft, with a different set of characteristics 
possible for each individual. 
• Automata: Each of the agents has its own internal decision-making 
algorithms, often referred to as individual personalities or rule-sets, 
which independently guide their actions in response to the 
environmental stimulus without user influence. 
MANA was chosen for construction of the urban combat scenario for a variety of 
reasons.  (1) MANA has an easy to understand graphical user interface (GUI), which 
minimizes the learning curve and allows rapid model construction, an important 
consideration in light of the limited research time available.  (2) Model runs can be 
replicated easily and modified quickly.  (3) Output consists of data and a visual replay of 
the scenario that aid in comprehending the events within the run and exploring surprising 
results.  (4) The MANA environment outcomes are driven by the behavior of the agents 
within the model, instead of a fixed script or interactive user inputs.  (5) Chance refers to 
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an invisible player on the modern battlefield and is present in MANA, which results in a 
large number of varied outcomes.  (Lauren and Stephen, 2000)  (6) MANA runs easily on 
a laptop computer but is resident at super computing centers (specifically, the Maui High 
Performance Computing Center (MHPCC) and the MITRE Corporation in Woodbridge, 
Virginia).  This significantly increases the ability to generate data for analysis.  (7) The 
final reason is that the US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory's Project Albert 
supports the use of MANA to examine and understand the landscape of potential 
simulated outcomes, enhance intuition, find surprises and outliers, and identify potential 
options.  (MCWL Website, 2005) 
MANA parameters are of four basic types: 
• Personality Weightings determine an agent’s propensity to move toward, 
or away from, an influence on the battlefield (friends, enemies, 
waypoints and/or desirable terrain).   
• Movement Constraints modify how an agent moves and are not used in 
the scenario.   
• Capabilities consist of weapons, sensors, movement speed, targeting 
priorities and communications.   
• Algorithm Modifiers include whether terrain affects speed, degree of 
randomness when moving, whether obstacles should be avoided, and the 




Simulating or modeling a scenario has a single intent: abstracting reality into 
those salient points necessary to promote understanding and insight.  Lesser details are 
omitted to simplify the model and to allow exploration of elements significant to the one 
who creates the experiment.  The model of the scenario contains the following 
assumptions: 
• Terrain modeling to the resolution of one foot is significant. 
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• Second story (+) effects are not a significant element. 
• Structures can be breeched, but cannot be destroyed. 
• Modeling of one step-per-second is an appropriate level of resolution for 
the activities in the model. 
• No ground vehicles are involved. 
• No air vehicles are directly modeled (indirect fire is characterized as 
bombs dropped on target). 
• Fatigue is not a factor for all simulated forces. 
• Resupply is not modeled. 
• A Marine Reconnaissance team is forward deployed prior to the start of 
the scenario. 
• The key elements that differentiate DO from a traditional force are 
organizational structure, communication capabilities, optics, tactics and 
training.  Tactics and training are not addressed in the model. 
• The insurgent force does not conduct electronic warfare. 
• The insurgent forced does not employ weapons of mass destruction. 
• The insurgent force is composed of paramilitary, non-uniformed, non-
state actors. 
 
3. Decision Points: Detail, Time and Behaviors  
 
Modeling of the scenario creates certain obstacles inherent to most modeling 
endeavors.  Foremost is the decision regarding the level of detail required in the model.  
A balance somewhere between modeling too much detail and not enough must be 
achieved.  The constraints help to shape the modeling efforts to fit the modeling 
environment and assist significantly in achieving the balance.  
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The first modeling decision point was the terrain.  The entire city of Fallujah was 
initially considered to serve as the terrain in the model scenario.  This was determined to 
be an unreasonable course of action when each individual structure is to be modeled as 
well as the inhabitants and combatants.  The full city and the incorporated agents could 
not be modeled in a reasonable amount of time, in the detail desired, and create a model 
in keeping with the original intent. The intent of the model is to portray urban combat at 
the individual Marine level and explore the effect of the DO force.  The MOUT facility 
terrain is used  to establish a reasonable and meaningful size for the terrain.   The 
dimensions of the MOUT facility determined the size of the Fallujah terrain (185 meters 
by 165 meters) used in the model.  The terrain size, in turn, determines that the assault 
force would be platoon sized.  The terrain, historical facts, and published intelligence 
determined the composition of the defending insurgent forces.   
Time is another modeling decision point.  Data for analysis results from each 
model run.  Early editions took six hours to simulate the six hours of battle.  Multiple 
runs are required to obtain sufficient data to allow meaningful analysis, but the initial 
long run times were undesirable because they translated into less data for analysis.  An 
adjustment was made to the model to reduce the time required to simulate the six hours of 
combat.  The adjustment was a reduction of the time spent by units inside a structure 
from 40 minutes to two and a half minutes.  The justification is that the time spent in 
structures is highly variable.  A realistic timeline for the attack of each structure was not 
possible due to the high variability and complexity of eliminating insurgents and 
thoroughly searching for weapons.  Two and a half minutes is sufficient for an agent to 
“forget” enemy locations as modeled in MANA.  This is similar to the real world where 
once a unit moves into a structure to clear it and emerges 40 or more minutes later, the 
array of enemy forces could have changed completely. The model currently takes twenty 
minutes to simulate a six-hour battle.   
A third decision point is the desire to achieve a balance of realistic military tactics 
and free acting agents.  The decision was made that the agents within the model are 
allowed to behave in a manner according to their perception and personalities.  The 
agents loosely follow a script that is created by a predefined set of waypoints to which 
they must travel in a set sequence.   The individual agent actions are not scripted, so 
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agents might be observed behaving in ways interpreted as an error or mistake, but the 
manner nonetheless conforms with their rule-set.  Every effort was made to capture the 
important relationships, interactions and dependencies of all the scenario elements. 
A note regarding some of characteristics inherent to MANA is appropriate since 
they impacted the decisions made in the creation of the model.  The modeling 
environment assessed battle damage perfectly, could not vary time of day or weather 
effects, and shared only position reports between agents.  These eroded the confusion and 
uncertainty elements, called the “fog of war” (Clausewitz, 1827) that are present in real 
combat.   
The driving intent of the model was to gain insight and to explore the concepts.  
The battle of al-Fajr occurred only once and can be considered a single replication of an 
experiment.  Only the most general comparison can be conducted between hundreds of 
simulation runs and a single event.  Therefore, emphasis is placed on the insights gained 
from an exploration of the relationships of model output values compared to the 




1. General Characteristics  
 
Table 2 summarizes the elements of the model terrain that existed in the model 
and their modeled characteristics.  The information shows how the type of terrain 
affected the speed of and agent and the cover (protection from small arms fire) each 
provides. In the model environment, the default setting was that weapons could not fire 
through walls.  Relative levels of concealment (protection from observation) were 
provided for each terrain type.  The final column of “MANA Color” aided in recognition 




Table 2. Terrain Effects on Agents in MANA Model 
 
Doctrine does not provide specifics regarding the movement rates of dismounted 
infantry in an opposed environment across urban terrain.  For the purpose of the model, 
dismounted infantry movement on opposed terrain at night is considered equivalent to 
dismounted infantry movement upon restricted terrain at night.  The rate is shown in 
Table 3. 
MANA Terrain Translation 
Type Speed Cover Concealment MANA Color 
Roads Fast None None Yellow 
Rubble Fast(-) Some Some Light Green 
Interior Slow(+) More More Dark Green 
Walls Slow None Near Complete Grey 
Unopposed Movement Rates 
Terrain Type Dismounted Infantry 
Unrestricted 4.0 kmph (day) 2.2 kmph (night) 
Restricted 2.4 kmph (day) 1.6 kmph (night) 
Severely Restricted 1.0 kmph (day) 0.1 to 0.5 kmph (night)
 
 
Table 3. Foundation for Dismounted Infantry in MANA Model 




  In the model, each grid is one foot by one foot.  The base movement rate for a 
dismounted infantry agent in the model is two feet-per-second.  The base rate of speed 
can be reduced by limiting effects of the battlefield terrain. 
Clutter on the urban battlefield restricts the ability to detect and classify friend or 
foe.  Uniformly distributed small, static visual obstacles (such as a telephone pole or a 
small tree) represent clutter on the battlefield.  Clutter exists in structures and in the 
regions around structures, but not in roads.  The difficulty lies in determining the proper 
level of clutter to affect how far agents can see in the model.   
 
Studies and historical analyses have shown that only 5 percent of all 
[engaged] targets are more than 100 meters away.  About 90 percent of all 
targets are located 50 meters or less from the identifying soldier.  Few 
personnel targets will be visible beyond 50 meters and usually occur at 35 
meters or less.   
—FM 90-10-1 
 
For the scenarios, a moderate level of clutter in tandem with the limiting visual 
restrictions of the terrain (buildings and concealment inherent in areas of the terrain) is 
modeled.  The engagement range is then visually confirmed in model runs to be within 
the desired range and reflecting the desired behavior. 
 
2. Jolan District, Fallujah, Iraq  
 
Creating the terrain involved taking satellite imagery of a section of the Jolan 
District, Fallujah, Iraq, and colorizing it with Microsoft Paint to create a simulated urban 
environment.  Figure 14 illustrates the process.  The region contained roads, 91 
structures, interior and exterior components of the terrain.  Additional limitations to the 
line of sight (LOS) were added to closer replicate the effect of rubble and clutter.   
 
 Figure 14.   Satellite Imagery of Jolan District Converted to Model Terrain 
(Photo Credit: NGA) 
 
3. MOUT Facility  
 
Creating the MOUT facility terrain was similar to creating the Fallujah terrain.  
Engineering plans were colorized using Microsoft Paint to create a simulated urban 
environment.  The region contains roads, 100 structures, interior and exterior components 
of the terrain.  Additional clutter limitations to LOS were also added in the same density 









D. FORCE CHARACTERISTICS AND BEHAVIORS 
 
Agents in MANA have multiple states containing influencers, which a model 
builder can set to specific values to design agent personalities.  Also many characteristics 
are essential in constructing an agent: unit composition and structure; agent states (e.g., in 
contact with enemy, not in contact with the enemy); movement rates; sensor capabilities; 
communication structure; lethality; survivability; situational awareness and tactics.  The 
remainder of this chapter summarizes how these elements of the scenario were modeled. 
The approach of modeling the agents was not to create each agent as an individual 
from the ground up.  Instead, a logical approach was taken.  Each agent of Blue or Red or 
Green (Media) or Yellow (Civilian) allegiance had the same general inherent personality 
characteristics of the color group.  Depending on the form and function of an individual 
agent, the characteristics (e.g., weapon type, communication links, and sensor capability) 
were adjusted to capture elements that differentiate one agent from another.   
 
1. Force Composition and Structure 
 
 
a. Traditional Platoon 
 
The traditional rifle platoon is manned with 44 members, organized in “a 
triangular structure composed of three rifle squads.  Each squad is a balanced group of 
three fire teams; one rifleman, within each fire team will be assigned to carry the 
M16/M203 grenade launcher system.”  (FMFM 6-4 Marine Rifle Company/Platoon )  
Figure 16 illustrates the structure of the USMC Infantry Rifle platoon.   
 Figure 16.   Doctrinal Organization of a USMC Infantry Platoon  
(After FMFM 6-4 Marine Rifle Company/Platoon) 
In the model, agents are armed with only their primary weapon.  Table 4 
shows the ID numbers assigned to each agent in the model and their primary weapon.   
 
ID RANGE BLUE UNIT COUNT SIZE WEAPON 
28 — 36 Infantry Rifleman 9 2 M16A2 
37 — 45 Infantry SAW 9 1 SAW 
46 — 54 Infantry M203 9 1 M203 
55 — 57 Infantry Squad Leader 3 1 M16A2 
58 Infantry Platoon Command 1 5 M16A2 
Table 4. Traditional Platoon Table of Agents, with ID Numbers, and 
Modeled Weapon 
 
b. DO Platoon 
 
(A) revolution in military affairs is about more than building new high 
tech weapons …  It’s also about new ways of thinking, and new ways of 
fighting. 
   —Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense  
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Whereas the structure and capabilities of the Traditional force are based 
upon current Marine Corps doctrine, the structure and capabilities of the DO force are 
based upon the content of the draft report Distributed Operations 2006 Capabilities and 
Enhancements Report from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, released in March 
2005.  
The manning (ranks, weapons, composition) of the DO Platoon will be the 
same as the Traditional Platoon.  What will be considerably different is the structure.  
Figure 17 shows the new structure. 
 
The standard DO task organization changes the number of personnel in the 
rifle squad from 13 members to 12.  One rifleman from each squad is put 
into either the Alpha or Bravo Command Group.  This is done to provide 
the command groups with needed drivers, radio operators, and security; 
thus allowing the group to operate independently for short periods of time. 
—DO Capabilities, 2004 
 
 
Figure 17.   Task Organization of DO Platoon (From DO Capabilities, 2004) 
 
Vehicles and the emulation of additional training for DO units are absent 
from the model.  Vehicles serve as a transportation asset instead of as a combat vehicle 
and are therefore absent from the model.  The additional training a DO Platoon receives 
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is unquantifiable at the current level of concept development.  These are good areas to 
explore in future models and follow-on research. 
 
Table 5 shows the ID numbers assigned to each Blue DO agent in the 
model and its primary weapon. The column called “moving parts” identifies that actual 
number of agents of that type that were present on the battlefield in the simulation. 
 
ID RANGE BLUE UNIT COUNT SIZE WEAPON 
59 — 64 DO Rifleman 6 2 M16A2 
65 — 70 DO SAW 6 1 SAW 
71 — 76 DO M203 6 1 M203 
77 — 79 DO Team C2 3 4 M16A2 
80 — 81 DO Command Group 2 4 M16A2 





The attachments in the model were drawn from the Weapons Platoon that 
directly supports the entire company and portions of the battalion mission.  The agents 
shown in Table 6 were attached to the platoon to execute the assault.  The indirect fire 
assets are representative of artillery and bombs from outside of the scenario and therefore 
cannot be engaged by the insurgent forces.  Although tanks were involved in Operation 
al-Fajr, not every unit had them.  Tanks are not a core component of DO and the decision 





ID RANGE BLUE UNIT COUNT SIZE WEAPON 
21 Reconnaissance Team 1 6 M16A2 
22 Sniper Team 1 1 M82A1A 
23 Howitzer/Mortar Team 1 4 Indirect Fire 
24 — 25 Machine Gun Team 2 1 Machine Gun 
26 — 27 SMAW Team 2 1 MK153 
Table 6. Attachments Table of Agents, with ID Numbers, and Modeled 
Weapon  
 
d. Insurgent Forces  
 
The red agents were modeled to fight to the death.  Reports from Fallujah 
noted, when called upon to surrender, the enemy would yell back “It is better to die and 
go to heaven than to surrender to infidels.”  (Bellon, 2005)  The actual size and 
composition of insurgent forces operating in the region of the scenario was impossible to 
determine exactly.  “US officials estimated that 2,000 to 3,000 hardcore insurgents were 
entrenched in the city at the time the assault began.”  The value of 2,700 was chosen as 
the possible number of insurgents in the city.  Next, the area of the model was divided by 
the area of the city to obtain a percentage of the city represented in the model: 0.003 or 
0.3 percent.  A uniformly distributed insurgent force would have eight insurgents in the 
area.  The insurgent forces were not uniformly distributed.  In expectation of the pending 
assault, the insurgents set up a 360-degree outer crust defense.  Higher densities of forces 
in the outlying areas of a city than in the center of the city characterize an outer crust 
defense.  The increased density was chosen to be a factor of four, which means there 
were 32 Red agents in the scenario region.  The majority of the force was insurgents with 
AK-47’s and insurgents with RPG’s.  There were a small number of riflemen from 
Saddam’s disbanded military and a machine gun, a single mortar team, two scouts and an 
IED.  The Red forces are summarized in Table 7. 
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ID RANGE RED UNIT COUNT SIZE WEAPON 
1 — 3 Insurgent 3 5 AK47 
4 Rifleman 1 4 AK47 
5 Mortar 1 1 82mm 
6 Machine Gun Team 1 1 .50 Cal  
7 — 15 Rocketeer 9 1 RPG 
16 Scout 1 1 AK47 
17 IED Scout 1 1 Trigger 
18 IED 1 1 IED 






The non-combatants modeled in the scenario were civilians and media 
agents.  The population of Fallujah was estimated to be approximately 250,000 with 90% 
of them evacuated.  A uniformly distributed population of civilians resulted in there being 
approximately 75 civilians in the model.  The two media agents followed the Blue 
Forces.  The non-combatant forces are summarized in Table 8. 
 
ID RANGE UNIT COUNT SIZE WEAPON 
19 Civilian (YELLOW) 1 75 None 
20 Media (GREEN) 1 2 None 





2. Agents States 
 
Agents have different personalities depending on their personality or state.  
Events in the model triggered the transition from one state to another.  The personality 
traits were weights that determined the level of attraction an agent had to other agents and 
terrain features.  Table 9 shows the weightings that each agent had to nine elements of the 
environment and the model settings in the different model states.  For a deeper 
explanation of the weightings and MANA states refer to the MANA Users Manual.  
 
COMPARISON OF AGENT CHARACTERISTICS AS MODELED IN MANA 
Color Red Red Blue Green Yellow 

































Cover 60 70 45 50 50 






Line Center N/A N/A -10 N/A N/A 
Squad Enemy 90 80 85 N/A N/A 







D - Default 
 
T- Taken Shot 
 
W- Reached   
      Waypoint 
 
S – Shot Taken 
 
E – Enemy Contact 
 
C – Squad Enemy 
       Contact 
 
F- Reached Final  
     Waypoint  
 
N/A – Not   
          Applicable 
 
Table 9. Comparison of Personality Characteristics of Agents in Model 
 
Refer to the MANA Manual for details regarding the effects of the weights.  The 
model used a small fraction of the states available in the MANA environment.  Every 
attempt was made to keep the model as simple as possible while adequately exploring the 
concepts. 
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The trigger and the priority of the “to” state determined the state to which an 
agent transitions.   
The “Default” state is anytime that the agent or his unit is not engaged with the 
enemy.  The “Shot At” state shifts the agents’ priorities to seeking cover and engaging 
the enemy.  The “Reach Waypoint” and “Reach Final Waypoint” states serve to 
consolidate the assaulting force on the intermediate or final objective before continuing 
the assaults.  “Enemy Contact” and “Squad Enemy Contact” are entered into when the 
agent is directly in contact with the enemy (the former) or a member of his fire team (the 
latter) is in contact with the enemy. 
The “TYPE” column of Table 9 includes the influences upon an agent making a 
decision in the model.  The closer a number (weight) is to 100, the greater an agent’s 
desire to move toward a particular feature is.  The closer a weight is to -100, the greater 
the desire of an agent to move away from a feature.  A setting of zero indicates no 
influence on an agent’s decision making. 
 
a. Blue Forces 
 
Blue Forces had the same set of states.  The diagram in Figure 18 shows 
the possible transitions to and from any state.  The “Shot Taken” state is the highest 
priority state and represents the time required by an agent to seek cover, rearm the 
weapon system, acquire a target and fire the weapon.  For emphasis, the “Shot Taken” 
state is colored red in Figure 18.  The time in state is determined by the sustained rate of 
fire for a weapon.  For example, an agent armed with the M16A2, which can fire 12 well-
aimed shots per minute (GlobalSecurity.org), would go into the “Shot Taken” state for 
five steps (five seconds) after every shot.  See Appendix G for weapon specific 
information. 
The “Enemy Contact” state is colored yellow because it was the state to 
which agents revert after any involvement with the enemy.   
 Figure 18.   State Changes of All Blue Forces Modeled in MANA 
 
b. Red Forces 
 
Red agents had fewer states than Blue agents due to their relatively static 
defense, and they had no waypoints.  The states are summarized in Figure 19.  Colors red 
and yellow have the same meaning as in the previous explanation for the Blue forces. 
 
 





The non-combatants are constantly in a default state.  Their behaviors do 
not change because the non-combatant’s principal desire is to stay safe, and a single hit 
(shot) eliminates a non-combatant agent, meaning they die.  The civilians are not 
intentionally targeted by either side, but can be killed as a result of collateral damage, 
typically the result of indirect fire. 
 
3. Movement  
 
The algorithms concerning the speed of an agent are based upon terrain, the 
maximum distance that can be moved during a time step, and the influences in the 
environment on the agent.  The base rate of speed is between one and two feet per 
second.  The base rate was calculated based upon the doctrinal rates published in FM90-
31 and reflected in Table 3. 
An assumption of the model is that night movement on restricted, unopposed 
terrain was similar to night movement on opposed, urban terrain.  The rate of 1.6 km/h 
converted to feet per second as illustrated in Table 10.   
 
1,600 meters per hour   ÷  60 minutes = 26 meters per minute 
26 meters per minute  ÷  60 seconds = 0.444 meters per second 
0.444 meters per second  X  3.28 feet per meter  =  approximately 1.5 feet per second 
Table 10. Calculation of Movement Rate in Model 
 
In the model, a time step is one second, so the rate of 1.5 feet per second 
translates into agents who can move at least one foot for each turn of movement and 50% 
of the time they can move a distance of two feet.  The movement rate is reduced in the 




   
The sensor levels are comprised of two ranges.  The first is the range in which an 
agent can detect another agent.  The second range is the distance that an agent can 
determine (or classify) whether another agent is a friend or foe.  The terrain within a 54 
foot (18 meters) range is also examined to determine its effect on movement action.  
Table 11 contains how far away an agent can detect another agent and the probability of 
classifying that agent as friend or foe each moment of model time in which they see 
another agent. 
 
UNIT DETECTION CLASSIFY PROBABILITY 
Red 150 meters 70% 
Blue Traditional 150 meters 80% 
Blue DO 300 meters 90% 
Blue Attachments 300 meters 90% 
Table 11. Detection Ranges and Probabilities to Classify per Time Step for 
Agents in Model (After DO Capabilities, 2004) 
 
Another assumption is the Red Forces have optics slightly inferior to those of the 
Blue Forces.  Table 11 indicates that for the model size (185 by 165 meters) all the agents 
have the capacity to see the entire terrain (barring line-of-sight restrictions like buildings 
and rubble).  The values in Table 11 are ideal ranges and are further modified by the 
terrain an agent occupies (i.e., at the table value in a street but significantly lower in a 




Communication in the model is considered the capability to talk to linked agents 
in the scenario.  In the model, only position locations are transmitted between senior, 
peer, and subordinate units.  Communication links for each unit are illustrated in 
Appendix F. 
 
a. Traditional Platoon 
 
“The current rifle platoon has one VHF radio by T/E allowance.”  (DO 
Capabilities, 2004)  The sole radio is an asset of the platoon leader.  Therefore, the 
platoon leader is the only entity in the Traditional Platoon model that can call for indirect 
fire support and communicate with platoon attachments. 
 
b. DO Platoon 
 
“A key difference between a current rifle platoon and a DO capable 
platoon is the unit’s communications capability.”  (DO Capabilities, 2004)  The DO 
Platoon is highly networked.  Indirect fire support can be called from the squad level and 
the squad leader is directly linked to every team in his squad.  The squad leader can 
communicate directly with platoon attachments.  Every internal team member is 
interlinked and Figure 20 graphically depicts the communication links.  The graphic in 
Figure 20 is from the MCWL Sea Viking experiment and shows the planned 
communication links at the squad size and below force levels. 
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Figure 20.   Communication Links within the DO Platoon  
(After DO Capabilities Report, 2004) 
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c. Red Forces 
 
The Red forces are expected to have limited communication assets.  The 
model assumes scouts can contact the machine gun team, mortar team, and the riflemen.  
The insurgents (armed with AK-47 and RPGs) do not have any communication links. 
 
6. Weapon Lethality 
 
The engagement rate, range and probability-to-hit a target serve to differentiate 
between the types of weapons employed.  Supporting information was obtained from 
GlobalSecurity.org and can be found in Appendix G.  Each agent has only one weapon  
to employ.  The restriction allows the rate of fire and engagement of different weapon 
platforms to be modeled and eliminates a situation in which an agent could fire a well 
aimed shot from two different weapons at the same second.  Engagement rates in the 
model are tied to doctrinal standards provided in FM90-10-1 and as obtained by weapon 
type from GlobalSecurity.org, see Appendix G. 
The weapons are capable of engaging targets well beyond the range of the model; 
therefore, the probability to hit is high (above 80% anywhere on battlefield), with the 
probability increasing as the range to target decreases.  Direct-fire weapons cannot fire 
through obstructing rubble or walls of buildings.  Indirect-fire weapons can fire at targets 




Survivability is the number of hits required to remove the agent from the fight.  
Injured agents on both sides continue to fight until the critical number of hits renders 
them dead.  Survivability is difficult to quantify, and for this reason the relative hits to 
kill an opposing side creates a ratio from which to gain insights.  
 LtCol David G.  Bellon reported a number of Marines have been wounded 
multiple times but refused to leave their fellow Marines.  (Bellon, 2004)  The ability of 
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injured Marines to stay in the fight shows they are tough, and the protective gear Marines 
wear significantly increases their survivability.  Reports indicate about 45% of wounded 
US troops are returned to duty in Iraq.  (Keiler, 2004)  The value is also intended to 
capture the effect of the additional protection Marines gain from their body armor. 
For these reasons, the number of times a Blue agent has to be hit to be killed 
(removed from the fight) is five compared to only two for the Red agents.  Again, these 
values serve to represent relative survivability of the opposing forces.   
 
8. Situational Awareness 
 
Situational awareness—Knowledge and understanding of the current 
situation which promotes timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of 
friendly, enemy, and other operations within the battlespace in order to 
facilitate decision making. An informational perspective and skill that 
fosters an ability to determine quickly the context and relevance of events 
that are unfolding 
—Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12C 
Situational awareness represents the sharing of a collective picture of what is 
known, and reported to be known, of the battlefield, between agents and the retention (or 
memory) of the information.  In the simulation, the memory of agents is limited to 30 
time steps (30 seconds).  The reasoning is that if an agent disappears behind a building 
and is gone more than 30 seconds, the observing agent will not have any idea of the 
previously observed agent’s new whereabouts.  The situational awareness is directly 
affected by whomever an agent has a communication link, so the DO forces have the 




In tactics, the most important thing is not whether you go left or right, but 
why you go left or right.  
—General A. M. Gray, USMC(R) 
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The size of the unit dictates the relative urban coverage.  A Marine company 
consists of three combat platoons and a weapons platoon.  In support of the scenario, one 
off-model platoon of the company has established a perimeter and cordoned the area.  A 
second off-model platoon is acting as the company reserve.  The assault platoon modeled 
is the company’s main effort and has attachments drawn from the Weapons platoon.  The 
specifics of the application of these tactics are explained more exhaustively in the 
publication Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). 1995. Vol. FM 3-06.11.   
The area should he divided into company zones of attack.   This can result 
in heavy fighting as each zone is systematically searched and cleared—
house by house, block by block.  Each company must clear its zone 
completely, leaving no enemy in its rear.  
—Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). 1995 
 
The model is an attempt to balance freedom of choice with doctrinal actions of the 
agents in an assault formation.   
 
a. Traditional Platoon 
 
The exact tactics used on the terrain in Fallujah in Operation al-Fajr are 
not available in unclassified format.  Militarily sound tactics were created with the help 
of a team of foreign officers, US officers, and military civilians at the Project Albert 
International Workshop in Sweden in May ‘05.  The panel consisted of Mr. Kurt Grau, 
IABG—Analysis and Testing Division—German Ministry of Defence, Colonel Mats 
Olofsson, Swedish Air Force, LtCol Rick Holdren, US Army, LtCol Dave Hingston, New 
Zealand Army, Captain John Cheong, Singapore Army, Captain Mike Babilot, USMC, 
and Mr. Edmund Bitinas, Northrop Grumman.    
The resulting tactics are house-to-house searches of the region with the terrain 
divided into three similar north-south zones.  Each squad is assigned a zone.  The squad 
assigns teams the responsibility of either clearing houses or providing over watch and 
security.   The responsibility is depicted in the model by the location of the waypoints 
59 
selected as the assault route. The routes are modified to accommodate the terrain (MOUT 
or Fallujah) in order to maintain a house-to-house assault. 
Model run performance was reviewed by a panel at the Naval Postgraduate 
School comprised of Col Ed Lesnowicz, USMC(R), Capt Matt Bain, USMC, Capt Todd 
Sanders, USMC, Professor Tom Lucas, NPS,  Professor Susan Sanchez, NPS, and 
Professor Paul Sanchez, NPS,  prior to executing the final data generating runs. 
 
b. DO Platoon 
 
Due to the newness of the DO force, the DO specific tactics have not yet 
been defined.  There is also the desire to compare DO to traditional units in the same 
context.  The same tactics are used for both the Traditional and DO forces to ensure the 




A news report from Fallujah noted “US units appeared to be lined up at 
the edge of their neighborhoods with some scouts and perhaps special operators venturing 
inside.” (Krane, 2004)  This report led to the decision to forward deploy a reconnaissance 
team in the model.  The remaining attachments are either directly attached to a specific 
team or placed in a position observing avenues of approach in order to provide cover fire 
for advancing agents.  Attached agents have the same characteristics as the supported 
unit. 
 
d. Red Force  
 
The insurgents in Fallujah operated in the manner characterized by Mr. 
Ware who said 
 (Insurgents acted in) … a classic guerrilla style, a rearguard detail to 
harass and interdict US forces.  They are a tenacious enemy who fight as 
any guerrilla force might—never head on, always from behind or the sides 
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at moments when it’s least expected, initiating combat at weak points and 
then pulling back to strongholds, ducking and weaving all the while.   
Red agents are set to attack Blue agents and to move away from Blue 




Iraqi health ministry's own figure for civilian casualties is 20 because it 
says most people are out of the town and those that are in have very 
sensibly—in fact they're compelled to—have stayed literally on the floor 
of their homes. 
—Paul Wood, from the BBC, Nov 2004 
 
 The civilian population in the model desires cover and concealment and 
to avoid enemies.  The intent is to have civilian agents gravitate toward protected areas 
inside structures and avoid combat areas. 
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V. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
The occurrences of war will not unfold like clockwork. Thus, we cannot 
hope to impose precise, positive control over events. The best we can hope 
for is to impose a general framework of order on the disorder, to prescribe 





DO is in the concept development phase, and the insights from this research can 
assist in that development.  The MOUT training environment is a continually evolving 
concept that can benefit from additional research.  The main purpose of the simulations is 
to provide decision makers insight and allow rapid exploration of many facets of both 
concepts.  This exploration requires testing the scenarios across many different parameter 
values.  MANA is stochastic, which means multiple replications, with varying random 
number seeds and the same parameter values can produce a range of different results.  
These results are analyzed to provide insight into the models. 
This section will highlight the process used to create the data for analysis from the 
scenarios introduced in the earlier chapters.  The Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) of the 
analysis is presented.  Next, the Design of Experiment is explored by examining the 
reasoning for each exploratory run.   
 
B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Measures of effectiveness—Measures designed to correspond to 







Measure of effectiveness (MOE)—A measure of operational success that 
must be closely related to the objective of the mission or operation being 
evaluated.  A meaningful MOE must be quantifiable and a measure to 
what degree the real objective is achieved.  
—The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 10th edition Glossary 
 
These quotes guided the effort to determine the best MOE for this research.  By 
definition, the MOE must support the hypothesis of the research.  The primary hypothesis 
is that the DO Platoon is the same as the Traditional Platoon in urban combat.  The 
secondary hypothesis is that there is no difference in effect on the outcomes of urban 
combat due to the differences in terrain between Fallujah and the MOUT facility. 
Numerous combat MOEs were considered for the analysis.  The Center for Naval 
Analysis suggest five types of measures.  Of the five, Task-Performance MOEs and 
Mission-Level MOEs are most applicable to the urban combat scenarios. 
Task-performance measures capture individual level-of-effort actions in the 
scenario (e.g., bullets fired per agent, enemy killed per agent, time in scenario until death, 
etc.).  Mission-level measures encompass the actions of the force operating in the 
scenario (e.g., Red agents killed, Blue agents killed, time until Blue reaches goal, etc.).  
(CNA, 1996) 
The application of the CNA guidance led to the following preliminary list of 
MOEs: 
• Number of Blue agents  killed (or percent Blue killed) 
• Number of Red agents killed (or percent Red killed) 
• Loss Exchange Ratio (Red Killed divided by Blue Killed) 
• Blue Force Time to Complete Mission 
• Number Blue-on-Blue kills (fratricide) 
• Number of non-combatant kills (or percent non-combatants killed) 
• Number of Red kills by Blue weapon systems. 
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The decision was made to focus the list to a single MOE in order to bound the 
research efforts.  The MOE elimination process was accomplished by evaluating each of 
the preliminary MOEs and selecting the one deemed to provide the most meaningful 
information.   
• “Number of Red kills by Blue weapon systems” and “Number Blue-on-Blue 
kills” were not included in the MANA data output and so were easily 
eliminated.  
• “Number of Red agents killed” and “Blue Force Time to Complete Mission” 
were eliminated because there was little variability in these values.  Nearly all 
the model runs took the maximum time allowed and involved the complete 
destruction of the Red force and therefore did not provide much insight.   
• “Number of Non-combatant kills’ could discriminate between the different 
scenarios, but was discarded because it was unrelated to the mission of 
eliminating the Red force.  
The remaining potential MOEs were “Number of Blue force killed” and the “Loss 
Exchange Ratio” (or LER).  The LER was selected as the MOE because it had the 
number of Blue kills as a component in its computation and retained the influence of the 
Red agents that were killed.  The ratio is highest when the number of Blue agents killed is 
a low number and the number of Red agents killed is a high number.  In the context of 
this research, a higher loss exchange ratio is preferred.  The value in using LER is that it 
is a surrogate for the combat effectiveness of a force and is similar to attacker to defender 
force ratios.  The LER MOE meets the criteria put forth by CNA in that it relates to the 
overarching mission, is responsive to actions in the model, and is meaningful.  (CNA, 
1996)  
The loss exchange ratio is relevant in light of the forces employed or the terrain in 
the model.  The validity of this MOE generates concern when there are no Blue agents 
killed in the simulation.  This was not the case in any of the baseline experiments and was 
therefore not a concern for that portion of the analysis.  Alternate LER MOEs were 
examined for use in the sensitivity analysis.  The reason being that in 40 of the 12,400 
simulation runs no Blue agents were killed.  There were no instances in which there were 
less than three Red agents killed.  The alternative LER MOEs considered are identified in 
Table 12.  The ones eliminated from consideration are designated with a red cross-out.  
The selected MOE for the comparative analysis of the hypothesis testing and the 
sensitivity analysis are circled in green. 
 




values with 1000 
Replace infinity 
values with 66 
Replace infinity 
values with 36 
Red Killed + 1 
Blue Killed +1 
 LER that serves a MOE for Baseline Comparison Analysis 
⇐ LER  that serves as MOE for Sensitivity Analysis 
% Red Killed 
% Blue Killed 
Replace infinity 
values with 1000 
Replace infinity 
values with 66 
Replace infinity 
values with 36 
% Red Killed + 1 
% Blue Killed + 1 
Blue Killed 
Red Killed 
% Blue Killed 
% Red Killed 
Note: there are 33 killable Red agents in the model. 
There are 55 killable Blue agents in the model. 
Table 12. Choices from Alternative LER MOEs Considered for Analysis 
 
The analysis of the next chapter uses the LER, calculated by the number of Red 
killed divided by the number of Blue killed, as the MOE for the baseline population 
comparisons.  The sensitivity analysis uses the LER with a “1” added to the numerator 
and denominator to allow evaluation of LERs that would otherwise result in a “0” or 
infinity value.  The sensitivity analysis also explores categorical levels of the LER MOE.  
 
C. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
 
The basis of this research is a comparison of forces and a comparison of terrains.  
Figure 21 shows the four-way comparison that serves as the foundation for this thesis.  
Each of the green squares represents one of the four models that form a basis for this 
research.  Examining the squares reveals that the top squares are of the same pattern 
(Fallujah) and the bottom squares are the same pattern (MOUT).  The terms “TRAD,” 
“DO” and “INSURG” represent the type of agents that characterize each model.   In 
64 
addition to the model of the two forces on the two terrains, various excursions are 
performed to examine the sensitivity of the model to critical parameter changes. The 
arrows represent the comparisons that are then conducted using data obtained from 
baseline and sensitivity experiments on the models. 
 
 
Figure 21.   Four Models Compared in Analysis 
 
A single run of the model takes 20 minute to simulate six hours of combat. 
Through use of the Maui High Performance Computing Center, 12,400 runs of the 
models representing over 3,720 computer hours were conducted.  The MHPCC is the 
repository for the super computing power used to run the experiments.  MHPCC is an Air 
Force Research Laboratory Center Managed by the University of Hawaii.  
The evaluation of the baseline models is obtained by running them 100 times 
each.  The importance of the sensitivity analysis is to determine how much the model 
outcomes are influenced by the same critical parameter settings.  
A gridded design of experiments is applied to each of the runs.  Gridded designs 
are useful for examining a limited number of factors at a few different levels.  This 
method targeted and explored select areas of the parameter space that are explained in the 
next section of this chapter.   
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The key areas of the model chosen for sensitivity analysis are: 
• the level of clutter on the battlefield 
• the number of times an agent must be hit by a weapon to be killed 
• the range at which an agent can classify another agent 
• the personal concealment level of an individual agent. 
The basis for choosing these factors to explore was gained from preliminary 
experimentation and by visually inspecting different settings on the factors to see the 
influence on the actions and outcomes of the model.  A summary of the experiment 
design and computing time calculations is provided in Table 13.  The 12,400 represent 
over 3,000 runs of each of the four models: DO on Fallujah, DO on MOUT, Traditional 










1 to 4 Baseline Force: Traditional, DO Terrain: Fallujah, MOUT 100      400 
5 to 204 Classification Range 
Blue: 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400 
Red: 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400   30   5,880 
205 to 304 Personal Concealment 
Blue: 20, 30,40, 50, 60 
Red:  10, 20,30, 40, 50   30   3,000 
305 to 364 Hits to Kill Blue: 4, 5, 6, 7 Red: 2, 3, 4, 5   30   1,920 
365 to 376 Terrain Clutter None, Light, Dense 100   1,200 
Total number of Runs 12,400 
Run Time of each model (hours)          0.33 
 
Total Estimated CPU run time required (hours)   4,092 
Table 13. Summary of Experimental Design and CPU Time Calculations 
 
D. SPECIFICS OF EACH EXCURSION 
 
1.  Baseline Models 
 
Four baseline models serve as the foundation for the analysis.  They are 
Traditional Platoon with attachments on Fallujah terrain; DO Platoon with attachments 
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on Fallujah terrain; Traditional Platoon with attachments on MOUT facility terrain; and 
DO Platoon with attachments on MOUT facility terrain.  Each of these four models is run 
for 100 excursions. 
 
2. Clutter on the Battlefield 
 
Preliminary experimentation showed that limitations to line of sight (LOS) in an 
urban environment are comprised of two elements: transitory and fixed.  Transitory 
effects are elements like smoke, wind, dust and weather influences.  MANA models these 
with a modifier that makes a probabilistic determination for each time-step of the model 
if an opposing agent in the field of view is observed.  Structures, trees, fences, rubble and 
rubbish cause a fixed effect that restricts LOS.  MANA only captures those elements 
modeled into the terrain.  To model the level of clutter in the urban environment visual 
runs were conducted with varying densities of uniformly distributed pixels that affected 
line of sight, but not movement.  This was accomplished by adding a pixel elevation map, 
with each white colored pixel acting as a sight limiter.  The reader is encouraged to refer 
to the MANA Users Manual to obtain comprehensive information regarding the model 
elevation map. 
The four levels of clutter modeled are none, light, medium and dense.  Visual 
observation showed that the medium density reduced agent line of sight to the 50-meter 
range indicated by doctrine. Figure 22 shows a comparative difference between the levels 
of clutter and the medium level used in the baseline models is illustrated. Clutter adds 
realism to create micro-terrain effects and limited peripheral vision effects that are 
common in urban combat.  As shown, the denser the concentration of clutter is on the 
battlefield, the more fractured the field of view of any particular agent is.  The graphics 
use lines to trace the line of sight of a particular agent and the line continues until it is 
obstructed.  This creates a 360-degree representation of what that agent can detect, or see, 
from its current position.  The graphic provides the Blue Force LOS in Blue, the Red 
Force LOS in Red and the non-combatants LOS in white, and is best viewed in color. 
 
 Figure 22.   Effects on Line of Sight with Varying Levels of Clutter 
 
Light, dense and no clutter levels were run for 100 iterations for each of the four 
models.  The medium-clutter-level case is captured in the 100 baseline runs. 
 
3. Hits to Kill an Agent 
 
Relative survivability of an agent is difficult to quantify.  It is common knowledge 
that body armor and training can increase an agent’s resilience on the battlefield.  
Anecdotal information has been provided in earlier chapters relating to Marines’ 
hardiness even after being hit.  The baseline was set so that five hits are required to kill a 
blue agent and two hits are required to kill a red agent.  These levels are set based upon 
visual review of different hit to kill levels and their impact on the outcome of the models.   
 The exploration of the levels of hit-to-kill can provide insight into the effects of 
relative survivability between Blue and Red forces and the impact of the ratio of 
hardening.  The Blue force was gridded on the values of four, five, six and seven against 
the settings of two, three, four and five for the Red force.  Each of the 16 combinations 
was run for 30 replications for each of the four models. 
 
4. Classification Range 
 
Classification range is the distance at which an agent can determine friend or foe.  
Although there are many limiting factors in the urban environment, there is some interest 
in exploring whether improving the agents’ ability to see through the transitory effects of 
the battlefield would significantly impact the outcome of battles. 
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Classification was gridded on the values of 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400 for 
both Blue and Red agents. This resulted in 49 combinations being run 30 times each. The 
levels correspond to a foot in measurement (e.g., 100 = 100 feet).  The upper and lower 
bounds are based upon the visual capabilities of the unaided eye.  Under night conditions, 
humans experience the worst visual acuity, estimated to be from 20/200 to 20/400, and 
possibly much worse according to FM 3-22.9.  This means that if an individual could see 
400 feet in daylight, then he would only see 20 feet in the worst night conditions.  The 
size of the model, a maximum dimension of 607 feet, equates to a daytime sight distance 
of approximately 6,000 feet. This distance is beyond the ability of an unaided eye but is 
possible with optics.  
 
5. Agent Concealment 
 
Concealment, sometimes referred to as stealth, is the passive concealment that an 
agent has, like the digitalized camouflage of the USMC utility uniform and training (e.g., 
stay low and move fast.)  The Red force represents an insurgent force that was not 
uniformed. These factors led to a modeling of the blue forces with a higher concealment 
level than the red forces. There was interest as to whether the proper relative concealment 
was applied in the model and how varying the relative concealment of the forces would 
affect the outcome. 
A gridded design examines Blue force concealment at 20, 30, 40, 50 and 60 
against Red force concealment of 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50.  Each of the 25 combinations is 




































VI. DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS  
A. OVERVIEW 
 
In the preceding chapters the models have been described, the MOE defined, and 
the experimental designs determined.  These have produced a volume of data to be 
analyzed, in light of the hypotheses, using Operations Research techniques.  This section 
identifies the analysis tool, data, outputs and methods involved in the processing and 
analysis of the data to reach the conclusions presented in the next chapter. 
 
B. ANALYSIS TOOL: JMP IN RELEASE:  5.1.2 
 
JMP® 5.1.2 statistical analysis software, for Windows, Macintosh, and 
now Linux, provides capabilities for all types of users to make quicker, 
data driven decisions that go straight to the bottom line. JMP provides 
companies with instantaneous insight and a common language for data 
analysis. The result is improved communication and quicker decision-
making, which leads to discovery and innovation.  
—WWW.SAS.COM 
 
JMP statistical discovery software is the analysis tool used to analyze the data 
obtained from the model runs.  JMP was chosen in light of its ease of use and 
comprehensive graphical user interface, ability to deal with data sets larger that Microsoft 
Excel’s capability, and its easily understood graphical and contextual output. 
The JPM software package allows quick and easy data manipulation with built-in 
spreadsheet capabilities.  The graphical output increases the likelihood of making a 
discovery in the data and facilitates understanding of the data.  The interactive nature of 
the software also allows one to extrapolate more deeply and to further refine the data 






JMP allows a user to implement many analysis techniques to analyze data.  This 
research focuses on three techniques available in the software package: graphical 
analysis, regression, non-parametric testing, and classification trees. 
The graphical output of JMP lends itself to graphical analysis.  This analytical 
method involves plotting aspects of the data and exploring different representations of the 
data.  It requires no assumptions about the data and is useful for identifying insights 
hidden within the data.  The principal method was examining histograms that show the 
characteristics and distribution of the samples. 
Certain assumptions regarding a population are required to apply parametric 
statistics.  Little is known about the true population parameters that are the basis for the 
data produced by the models.  Nonparametric methods will be used to test the 
hypotheses.  Nonparametric statistics are often referred to as distribution free, meaning 
that the analysis methods are valid without knowing the parametric distribution of the 
underlying population.  (Conover, 1999)  The issue of symmetry is addressed by 
analyzing the differences of the samples to examine the hypothesis. 
Trees are a method by which the data are recursively partitioned.  The partitioning 
of the successively smaller data sets occurs at the split that most significantly 
differentiates the data into two separate sub-sets of like responses. 
 
C. MODEL DATA 
 
The 376 experiments identified in Table 14 produced 12,400 sets of data, one for 
each simulated mission.  The length of time required to run the model influenced the 
desire to keep the number of runs required in each experiment to as few as possible while 
maintaining a sufficient sample to analyze.  The clutter experiments explore the density 
of clutter (fixed LOS obstructions) present on the battlefield and are uniformly spread at 
the density level everywhere but in the roadways.  The clutter levels are classified 
relative to the level of clutter present in the baseline experiments. 
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376 SETS (94 OF EACH OF THE 4 MODELS) 
 196 Classification Experiments 
 100 Concealment Experiments 
   64 Hit-to Kill Experiments 
   12 Clutter Experiments  
           (None, Lighter and Denser Clutter) 
     4 Baseline (2 Forces by 2 Terrains) 
Table 14. Experimental Design Detail 
 
The MANA experiments produced a large quantity of data that was then refined 
from their raw state.  The raw output consisted of data regarding the end state count (dead 
or injured) for each of the 81 agents in the model, the simulation run seed, model 
duration, and other statistics that were not used in this analysis.  The raw data were 
refined to indicate the information in Table 15.  Of these values, LER serves as the MOE 






Clutter LER Log(LER) LER 2 lvl 
Exp 10 1004 Fallujah 2 0.118 -2.14006 4:1 minus 
Exp 11 1018 Fallujah 2 0.118 -2.14006 4:1 minus 
Exp 58 2510 MOUT 2 0.139 -1.97048 4:1 minus 
       
Hits-to-Kill Concealment Classification  LER 5 lvl 
Blue Red Blue Red Blue Red 
 0 to 1 5 2 Varied Varied 100 350 
 0 to 1 5 2 Varied Varied 100 400 
 0 to 1 5 2 Varied Varied 100 300 
Table 15. Sample of 12,400 Lines of Refined Data from Model Output 
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All experiments ran 30 times each, except the baseline and clutter experiments, 
which ran 100 times each.  The average Red and Blue killed for each experiment is used 
to calculate a mean LER MOE for the 376 experiments and is saved in a separate file in 
order to serve as an additional data source to explore. 
Two different categorical LER MOEs’ are created based upon the LER produced 
from each of the 12,400 runs.  These are explained in greater detail in the sensitivity 
analysis section of this chapter. 
 
 
D. HYPOTHESIS TEST: POPULATION COMPARISONS 
 
1. The Basic Comparisons 
 
The intent of this research is to determine from the simulation whether the combat 
results of the DO Platoon are the same as the modeled Traditional Platoon.  The 
secondary emphasis is determining how the modeled MOUT terrain compares to the 
Fallujah terrain.  This is determined by identifying whether the results from the baseline 
experiments can be considered to be from the same or different populations.  To do this 
six pair-wise comparisons are conducted: 
• DO on the two terrains 
• Traditional on the two terrains 
• DO compared to Traditional on Fallujah terrain 
• DO compared to Traditional on MOUT terrain 
• DO on Fallujah Terrain compared to Traditional on MOUT terrain 
• DO on MOUT Terrain compared to Traditional on Fallujah terrain. 
For simplicity, the MOEs of the four separate experiments are referred to as LER 
1 through 4, and they are: LER 1 = DO on Fallujah; LER 2 = DO on MOUT; LER 3 = 
Traditional on Fallujah; and LER 4 = Traditional on MOUT. 
75 
 
2. Testing Assumptions 
 
The analysis presented in this research reflects only a sampling of the data 
examined and the extent of the data exploration performed.  The analysis provided in this 
document is the heart of the research efforts and is intended to illustrate the analysis.  In 
the interest of brevity and applicability, the parametric statistical analysis performed is 
not detailed since the normality assumption was proven to be violated.  Only a 
representative analysis is presented to justify the conclusions drawn and the insights 
obtained and presented in the next chapter.  
 
a.  Independence 
 
The first question to be answered: Are the groups unrelated and 
statistically independent or are they matched pairs of groups performing in different 
events?  The experiments are considered matched pairs because each was run with the 
same set of random seeds and the same personality weightings.  In essence, the 
experiments can be considered a “before and after” where DO enhancements have been 
added or the same agents run through a different environment. 
Since the data produced by the different experiments may be slightly correlated, 
this must be considered during the analysis.  (Sall et. al., 2005)  If it is not considered, 
valuable information may be lost.  This translates into a p-value that is lower than the one 
produced by the paired t-test (for a positive correlation) and could lead to the error of 
failing to reject a false null hypothesis.  
 
b.  Normality 
 
The Shapiro—Wilk W test is performed upon each of the baseline 
experiments.  The results of this test provide statistical evidence of non-normality in the 
LER data.  The test produces a probability value, or p-value, which indicates the 
statistical probability of obtaining the test results or more extreme ones, just by chance, if 
in fact the data are normal. The threshold value for the p-value is usually taken to be 0.05.  
(Conover, 1999)  Therefore, values less than 0.05 are considered statistically significant. 
Figure 24 was produced in JMP 5.1.  It is a distribution of the LERs (as a 
histogram) computed from each of 100 baseline runs in each of the four baseline 
experiments.  To the right of each histogram is a boxplot of the data illustrating the mean, 
quantile ranges and outliers.  Figure 23 allows a quick visual assessment of the data and 
shows summary statistics regarding the sample and the results of the Shapiro-Wilk W test 
for each sample.  Examining the data from the four experiments indicates a p-value 
(indicated by ‘Prob<W’ entry in Figure 23) of less than 0.0001, as indicated in Figure 23.  
This means that there is less than a hundredth of a percent chance that if the data actually 
are normal, we would observe these or more discordant results.  The red line overlaid on 
the histogram depicts how a normal distribution of the data would look and provides a 
visual cue of further evidence of non-normality in the data. 
 
 
Figure 23.   Results of Testing Four Baseline Experiments Data for Normality 
  
The assumption of normal data is not valid for these data and indicates that non-




3. Performing the Analysis 
 
The absence of normality in the data led to the decision to use the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank (rank-sum) test and the Kruskal-Wallis test to examine the 
hypotheses.  The Kruskal-Wallis test is one of the most powerful non-parametric tests for 
comparing three or more samples and the signed rank test is similarly powerful in testing 
the null hypothesis that two populations have identical distribution functions.  (Easton 
and McColl, 2005)  The two tests do not require the differences between the two samples 
to be normally distributed. (Conover, 1999)  The baseline runs are separated into the four 
individual experiments and compared.  The runs are also combined along terrain 
relationships and evaluated.  Finally, the runs are combined along force employed and 
tested.   
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to examine all six possible comparisons 
and the results, from JMP 5.1, are provided in Figure 24.   This test can be used to 
determine if any two models are different. Here the p-value has the same meaning as 
before.  The p-value is the ‘Prob > |t|’ entry in Figure 24 given the null hypothesis is true.  
Each comparison shows that if the models were actually the same (indicated by the 





Figure 24.   Results of Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test result from JMP 5.1 in Figure 26.  This is a non-
parametric test that tests the null hypothesis that all four baseline experiment group 
means are equal without regard to the nature of the overall population (e.g., normality).  
(Conover, 1999)  In this test the p-value is the ‘Prob>ChiSq’ value, which indicates that 
if the models actually are the same, the likelihood of seeing results like this, or more 
extreme, are one-tenth of a percent, which is not very likely.  Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 
Figure 25.   Results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test 
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 The results of the two tests agree.  There is statistical evidence that the four 
samples are each from a different population.   
The baseline experiments are next divided according to whether the Blue forces 
are DO or Traditional.  The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test is again used to determine if 
there is a significant difference between the results obtained from using DO Forces 
compared to the use of the Traditional forces.  The JMP 5.1 obtained results are presented 
in Figure 26.  The p-value (‘P{rob > |t|’) is 0.002, which is significantly different from 
the threshold value of 0.05 and indicates there is a difference that results from the use of 
different force types in the two scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Different Means of DO and Traditional Sample 
 
Next, the baseline experiments are divided according to the terrain, either Fallujah 
or MOUT.  The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test is used to see if there is a significant 
difference in the outcomes from Fallujah compared to MOUT.   The results in Figure 27, 




 Figure 27.   Different Means of Fallujah and MOUT Sample 
 
The results of this section are interpreted in the next chapter. 
 
E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
1.  Preparing the Data 
 
Now that the baseline models have been explored to determine if the hypotheses 
should be rejected or not, there is interest in exploring the data to see other insights that 
may exist.  
In order to better characterize the LER, this MOE has been converted into 
categorical levels.  The intent is to capture an interpretation of the LER, not the precise 
value.  Historical studies performed by the U. S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory 
have shown that the attacker-to-defender ratios in the 22 urban battles was approximately 
4:1.  (McLaurin, Jureidini, and McDonald, 1987)  The size of an attacking force relative 
to the defender can be a critical determinant of the successful outcome of battle.  The 
LER can serve as a surrogate to the force ratio identified from historical urban conflicts. 
A LER greater than or less than force ratio may exist, but the author considers the 
relationship sufficient to allow the reader to gauge the model results in light of the fixed 
number of forces on each side that exists in this scenario. 
Two different versions of the categorical data are explored.  Version 1 is split into 
an above and a below category and version 2 divides the two regions into a total of five 
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regions.  These splits are shown in Figure 28 in the histogram format produced by JMP 
5.1.  To the right of each horizontal bar is a number that indicates the percentage of 
values that are contained in that bar and correspond to the tabulated values at the bottom 
of the figure. 
 
 
Figure 28.   Categorical Results of 12,400 Model Runs 
 
The historical 4:1 level serves as a point of departure for determining the 
categories for LER.  The levels above and below 4:1 are of interest, so four served as the 
initial bin separator for the data.   
The five categories were created by dividing the initial two levels.  The region 
below 4:1 was subdivided into three areas of interest:  




• the partition from 1:1 to 2:1 captured all battles that end in Blue and 
Red at  near parity for loses; and  
• the remainder from 2.01:1 to 3.99:1 captured those outcomes in which 
Blue achieves a slight advantage over Red.   
The above 4:1 bin was split into two parts, with a break at 9:1, to show those 
outcomes in which Blue attains a lopsided victory over Red.   
Some may question the 4:1 force ratio and argue that attackers prefer a 5:1 or 6:1 
or even a 100:1 ratio.  The response to this is that the 4:1 ratio has been shown to hold as 
recent as the battle of Khorramshahr, in 1980 in the Iran-Iraq war.  In this battle the 
defenders, irregular Iranian forces, outnumbered 4:1, held the city for 26 days.  (MOUT 
Homepage  and MCRP 3-35.3A )  Although LER and force ratios can be significantly 
different due to technical and/or morale superiority, the model forces are fixed in 
numbers, have similar technical sophistication, and morale is not captured in this model.  





A stepwise regression was performed to examine the relationship of the factors 
(e.g., troop hardening, classification ranges, personal concealment, terrain, force type and 
clutter) to the LER.  Stepwise regression is a method of selecting factors with significant 
effects for a regression model.  “It is used when there is little theory to guide the selection 
of terms for a model and the modeler, in desperation, wants to use whatever seems to 
provide a good fit.”  (Sall et. al., 2005)  The intent of regression is to determine a 
mathematical equation that explains the behavior (data output) in the simulation.  
Parameter coefficients (weights) are determined in a manner that minimizes the error of 
explaining all the data.  The stepwise regression procedure in JMP 5.1 produced the 
model illustrated in Figure 30.  The mathematical equation shown provides an 
explanation of the response (LER) based on the significant factors that result in a minimal 
amount of error.  Though many models were created, the one indicated in Figure 29 
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provides parameter estimates for the significant factors that result in the most preferred 
R-squared value, 71.9%, and an adjusted R-squared value of 70.3%.  By definition, the R-
squared value is the explained proportion of the variation in LER from fitting the model 
to the input values. (Conover, 1999)  An R-squared value of 1.0 indicates that the model 
fits the data perfectly.  The model provides a common sense validation of the behavior of 
the models.  When Blue capabilities are improved, the LER improves.  When Red 
capabilities are improved, the LER is reduced.   The terrain and force type that affect 
model results are also identified.   
The lower left portion of Figure 29 contains t-Ratio information.  The t-Ratio is 
the ratio of the value estimated by the model formula to its standard error.  A t-Ratio 
greater than 2 (in absolute value) corresponds to a significance of less 5%. (Sall et al., 
2005)  The absolute magnitude of the t-Ratio indicates the relative influence a factor has 
on the outcome of the LER.  The “23.12” for “Blue_Classification” is the largest value in 
the table and thus has the most statistical significance in explaining the LER.  The 
positive sign indicates that there exists a positively correlated relationship (i.e., as 
“Blue_Classification” increases the LER value produced in the simulation also 
increases).  This is contrasted with the second highest magnitude value of “-18.16” for 
“Red_Classification.”  However, in the case of “Red_Classification, the relationship is 
negatively correlated (i.e., as “Red_Classification” increases the LER value decreases).  
Inspection of the remaining values yield an understanding of how the factors influence 
LER relative to one another and agree with real world expectations of model behavior. 
The Analysis of Variance section of Figure 29 allows one to compare and predict 
the mean of the data compared to the equation of the model.  This information combined 
with a visual examination of the Predicted Plot allow us to conclude that the model 
equation fits the data far better than predictions based upon the mean alone. 
 
 Figure 29.   Regression Model of  the Simulations 
 
3.  Classification Trees 
 
The categorical LERs are used to examine the effects of different factors that 
influence the LER.  They are an exploratory technique to examine the data structure 
captured from experiments. In the creation of classification trees, the data is partitioned, 
or separated, at the most significant factor at each split that partitions the variable space 
into regions that are increasingly similar (homogeneous.)  (S-Plus 4 Guide to Statistics, 
1997)   The splitting point creates an upper and lower range of the factors that most 
significantly explains the MOE.  Each level proceeds with a partition that differentiates 
the largest portion of the subset of data in question.  The result is a set of prediction rules 
that allows the data to be screened and summarized quickly.  Use of classification trees is 
a valuable method with this data since much of the data are categorical (terrain, clutter) 
that are not continuous.  Figures 30 and 31 show two of the more telling pieces of trees 
produced by JMP 5.1.  Each figure starts with a base node that contains all 12,400 LERs 
produced by the experiments.   
Figure 30 examines all the variable factors that were examined in the 
experiments.  Figure 30 shows that, above all other factors, the ability of the Blue Forces 
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to be able to classify other agents beyond 200 feet leads to higher (preferred) LERs, and 
this is where the first split in the data occurs.  The diagram shows that the split that 
produced the most (internally) alike partitions occurs where Blue’s Classification range 
crosses the 200 level.  This means that Blue Classification, as modeled, is identified as 
the most important factor in determining the resulting LER from the simulation.  The 
1,680 results are most similar and the classification range in those runs is less than 200.  
The other 10,720 have a Classification range of 200 or greater.  Additional splits occur at 
each level recursively to produce homogeneous branches and a limited number of these 
splits are included in the figure.  Figure 30 shows that Red Classification is the second 
most important factor in the resulting LER. 
Figure 31 also examines all 12,400 LERs, but only with respect to the factors of 
clutter, force type (DO or Traditional), and terrain (MOUT of Fallujah.)  The effect of 
terrain is most pronounced.  In this case, the first split is a result of the terrain that exists 
in the particular experiment:  the split 6,200 of the MOUT experiments and 6,200 of the 




Figure 30.   Classification Tree Shows Importance of Blue Classification 
Range 
 
Figure 31.   Classification Tree Shows Importance of Terrain over Force Type 
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.  Clutter Examined 
The role of clutter is also explored.  A washout effect is believed to exist in the 
full dat
mbined 
Figure 32, produced in JMP 5.1, illustrates the relationship that is revealed 
through
e.  The 
The illustrated relationship also shows that the terrain effect, when combined with 
clutter,
ly 







a set in regards to clutter since 90 percent of the data have the same level of 
clutter.  In order to better examine the clutter effect a balanced sample of 1,600 
observations are examined.  From this examination, the effect of clutter when co
with the other factors is obvious.   
 the regression of terrain and clutter against the response value LER.  The 
relationship shows that lower levels of clutter lead to more favorable LERs for Blu
explanation can be gleaned by observing the simulation as it runs.  The agents act upon 
the targets they know and take the initiative to engage them intent on a quick kill.  The 
agents pursue the known threats and appear to expose themselves to unknown threats.  
The higher level of clutter on the battlefield leads to a greater potential for unknown 
threats that could exist to actually exist. 
 is different by an approximately constant value, as indicated by the parallel red 
and green lines.  This too makes sense in that clutter is added to the terrain and intuitive
one should agree that the ability to see and identify a target is not improved by adding 
additional obstructions to a set terrain and that the affect could be linearly related (or 
could equate) to a proportional reduction in LER. 
early as good as the one presented in Figure 29.  This can be verified by 
comparing the adjusted R-squared value of 58.58% for Figure 33 to the 70.03% v
obtained from the model in Figure 30. 
 Figure 32.   Effect of Clutter in Combination with Terrain Type on LER 
 
Figure 33, also produced in JMP 5.1, illustrates the relationship that is revealed 
through the regression of Blue Force type (DO or Traditional) against clutter.  It again 
shows that lower levels of clutter, lead to more favorable LERs for Blue.  It also shows 
that the force effect, when combined with clutter is different by an approximately 
constant value, as indicated by the parallel red and green lines, but is not as significant as 
the terrain effect observed in Figure 33. The model created in this case in which only 
clutter and Blue Force type effects on LER are examined is also not nearly as good as the 
one presented in Figure 29.  This can be verified by comparing the adjusted R-squared 




 Figure 33.   Effect of Clutter in Combination with Force Type on LER 
 
F. SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS 
 
1.  Respondent Demographics 
 
To gain insight and understanding of the impact of MOUT training to urban 
combat, 251 surveys were conducted.  Figure 34 shows the histogram of the distribution 
of ranks and units information of those who completed surveys.  Also provided in Figure 
35 is clarification on the USMC military rank structure from highest rank (General) to 
lowest (Private) and the corresponding military grades (O-10 to E-1).  Tags in the 
histogram correspond to abbreviated forms of the ranks (e.g., 1LT = First Lieutenant, 
MSGT = Master Sergeant).  The prequalification criteria met by the respondents were 
that they were US Marines and were part of a unit that was involved in urban combat in 
Iraq.  The figure shows that 68% of the respondents are Lance Corporals, E-3, and below.  
This compares favorably with the overall USMC population of 177,208 Active Duty 
Marines, of which 44 percent are Lance Corporals or below.  (MCCS Demographics, 
90 
2005)  Nearly one-third of the responses were received from the 1st Battalion, 7th 
Marines.   
 
 
USMC Rank Structure 
Figure 34.   Demographics of Survey Respondents 
 
Eighty-four percent of the respondents had three or fewer years of service and 
sixty-five percent had completed a single tour of duty  Of the 251 respondents, 205 
reported their level of combat experience to be, on average, in excess of 255 days.  Of 
that, an average of more than 200 of those days were in urban combat. Approximately 
fifteen percent of the respondents reported that they did not receive MOUT training prior 
to their combat experience. 
The survey itself was 134 questions in length and is provided in Appendix I.  The 
survey questions are designed to gauge the perceptions that combat experienced Marines 
have of MOUT training. 
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2.  Survey Data 
 
The analysis of the full wealth of responses provided by the 135 questions is 
beyond the scope of this research.  Trends apparent in the responses are focused upon 
here.  Significant trends identified in the survey data are 
• Ninety-five percent of the respondents reported that most casualties 
occurred outside of buildings. 
• The highest proportion of the casualties occurred when troops were in 
clusters.    
• An overwhelming majority of the Marines felt they were prepared for 
urban combat from MOUT facility training.  Figure 36 from JMP 5.1 
shows the histogram distribution of responses from the lowest level of 




Figure 35.   Level of Proficiency in Urban Combat Gained from MOUT 
Training 
 
• In regards to the issue of MOUT facilities being large enough and 
realistic, the respondents tended to agree that the facilities were 
92 
sufficiently large and realistic.  When asked if they felt the MOUT 
environment accurately depicted the urban environment where they 
fought, most said Iraq urban terrain was not accurately captured by the 
MOUT facilities. Figure 37, produced in JMP 5.1, shows the 
histogram distribution of the responses. 
 
 
Figure 36.   Survey Respondent Opinions regarding Size, Realism and 
Accuracy of MOUT Training Facilities 
 
• When asked specifically regarding the exterior and interior of MOUT 
training facilities, a majority rated the realism in the poor to fair range.  






Figure 37.   Survey Responses When Asked to Rate Interior and Exterior 








VII. FINDINGS, INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSION  
War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which 
action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser 
uncertainty….The commander must work in a medium which his eyes 
cannot see; which his best deductive powers cannot always fathom; and 






This chapter translates the data analysis of the previous chapter into conclusions 
and findings.  Significant and meaningful relationships are identified and justification for 
observed phenomena is provided.  As is typical of research, in seeking to answer the 
research questions at hand, many new areas of potential research have been uncovered.  
The final chapter of this document summarizes the key areas that can benefit from 
additional research.   
 
B. BASELINE MODEL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank and the Kruskal-Wallis tests agreed that each of the 
four main samples are statistically significantly different from all the others (e.g., the 
results of DO is different from the results of Traditional Platoon results, and that the 
results obtained from operations on Fallujah are statistically significantly different than 
those from the MOUT terrain.)   
The following graphic of Figure 38 prefaces the full explanation of the differences 
to aid in understanding the JMP output called the “means diamonds” plot.  The dots 
represent each of the individual experimental runs.  The spread of the values from high to 
low in each experiment is due only to the stochastic elements of the model.  The 
diamonds create a 95% confidence interval for the estimated mean and overlays the data 
points.  This confidence interval can then be compared to other mean confidence levels 
and conclusions regarding significant differences can be drawn.  The y-axis is the LER of 
the observation.  The x-axis is the factor of concern.  The vertical column of dots 
represents the individual observations.  The upper and lower bars are called the “overlap 




Figure 38.   Example Diamond Plot 
 
Although the previous chapter proved that the samples are drawn from 
statistically different populations, the meaning of this was deferred to this chapter.  
Figure 39, in conjunction with Table 16, allows an interpretation of the differences.  The 
Fallujah terrain leads to a higher average LER regardless of force type.  The DO force 
performs better in an environment where the structures are not as concentrated.  This is 
reflected in the data that shows a lower LER for DO in MOUT (a terrain with denser 
structural clusters) than in Fallujah.  The data show that the effect is apparent in the 
Traditional force as well, but not to as great a degree.   
The possible reason, obtained from visual examination of model runs, is that the 
additional information available to the DO force may cause it to expose itself to unknown 
threats while pursuing one identified through its enhanced situational knowledge.  A 
difficulty faced by any simulation is that the system operates on logic and responds to the 
known elements in their environment.  Technology does not currently allow the 
simulation of many battlefield variables that a Marine in combat actually acts upon.  An 
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additional conclusion is that a Traditional force is less affected by variations in terrain, 
but at the expense of not being able to attain as high an LER as the DO force. 
 
EXPERIMENT MEAN (LER)
DO Fallujah 5.835 
DO MOUT 3.460 
Traditional Fallujah 4.810 
Traditional MOUT 4.262 
















The regression equation with an adjusted R-squared of 0.7 can be considered a 
relatively good model.  The adjusted R-squared means that 70% of the total squared error 
is explained by the model.  The remaining 30% is unexplained squared error. 
The model itself conforms to the behavior expected.  As Blue concealment, Blue 
hits to kill, and Blue classification range increase, the LER increases.  The model also 
agrees with the conclusion that LER is higher on Fallujah terrain. 
 
2.  Classification Trees 
 
The classification tree in Figure 34 shows that when considering the full set of 
data that Blue Classification range is the principal influence on the resulting LER.  This is 
followed by the Red classification range.  This makes sense since the ability to classify an 
agent corresponds with being able to engage the enemy, especially in close quarters and 
quickly evolving urban terrain.  Improvements to engagements to either side should 
directly impact LER as the classification tree indicates. 
The classification tree in Figure 35 examines only the effects of the factors of 
clutter, terrain and force type.  It shows that the terrain effect is the dominant effect over 
the other two.  This is followed by force type.  This is not altogether surprising since 90% 
of the clutter values are the same, and this may dilute the effect of clutter. 
 
3.  Clutter Examined 
 
The effect of clutter and terrain on LER was investigated by regression. The 
relation is illustrated in Figure 36 in the last chapter.  The parallel lines indicate that the 
clutter effect has a negative correlation to LER, as clutter increases, LER decreases.  
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Also, when combined with a particular terrain, the difference caused by the clutter 
appears to be nearly constant. 
 
D. SURVEY INFERENCES REGARDING POPULATION 
 
The survey responses identified that Marines noted a lack of realism in MOUT 
training facilities and a large portion felt that the facilities did not accurately capture the 
features of the terrain encountered in Iraq. 
Further research is recommended to determine the impact of MOUT realism to 



























































VIII.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES  
The many facets of this research have provided a wealth of topics worthy of 
follow-on work.  The topics fall into three general categories: Survey analysis, existing 
model work, and new model exploration.  The topics can be explored from a Distributed 
Operations point-of-view, urban combat point-of-view, a MOUT Training Facility point-
of-view, or any combination of the three. 
 
A.  SURVEY ANALYSIS 
 
The 251 completed surveys contain a collection of open-ended questions that can 
be explored and translated into the modeling environment or contrasted to design points 
in MOUT training facilities.  The categorical survey data can also be analyzed to identify 
trends and insights from the combat experience responses (specifically direct fire 
engagement ranges and casualty locations). 
 
 
B.  EXISTING MODEL WORK 
 
The current model can be modified to explore field of view (how much of the 
surrounding area can actually be observed by an agent based upon the direction that agent 
is facing) and range of view (the distance away from an agent that can be observed by 
that agent) effects on unit movement rates in the urban environment.  The effect of road 
width, alleys, and dispersion of troops on movement rates in different urban 
environments can be examined.  Another modification could be done to identify the 
practical minimum or optimal proximity limit to the target for employing various types of 
indirect fires.  Research can be performed with the current model to explore whether 
better sensors and communication affect the ratio of direct-fire engagements to indirect 
fire.  Research can also be conducted with the model to find the relationship between 
troop dispersion and casualty rates.  The current model can also be run through different 
urban combat scenarios from Iraq to see if additional insights can be gained.  The current 
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model can also be used to explore various tactics that may be appropriate for DO forces 
or that may enhance Traditional force urban combat operations. 
 
C.  NEW MODEL EXPLORATION 
 
The current model can be explored by being recreated in the Pythagoras, Combat 
XXI modeling, and other modeling environments.  Each environment has different 
strengths that could more readily explore concepts like interactive influences between 
different types of agents (e.g., allegiance changes).  A different modeling environment 
can also model how multi-level structures change the threat environment for mounted and 
dismounted troops. 
 
A model could be created to explore casualties effects from urban combat 
weapons employment in daylight versus night combat operations, with and without 
optics.  The concept of an embedded media effect could also be explored. 
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APPENDIX A: ORGANIZATION INVOLVED IN URBAN 
MODELING AND SIMULATION 
Urban Operations Summit IV was held on 19-21 January 2005.  The event 
included a keynote address from Dr. Russell Glenn, RAND, renowned urban operations 
expert and perspectives from senior leaders representing the Joint, Army and USMC 
communities.  The following list contains organizations that attended this conference and 
articulated the emphasis and efforts being put into the modeling and simulation of urban 
environments.  Much of the presentation material and lessons learned shared in side-bar 
discussions with modeling experts throughout the DoD assisted the author to comprehend 
the urban environment and the challenges faced in modeling it. 
Organization Involved in Urban Modeling and Simulation 
RAND Corporation 
MITRE Corporation 
US Army Engineer Research and 
Development Center (ERDC) 
Natick Soldier Center (NSC) 
Center for Army Analysis (CAA) 
Night Vision and Electronic Sensors 
Directorate (NVESD) 
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) 
Applied Research Laboratory (ARL) 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army 
(Operations Research) (DUSA (OR) 
Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)  
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) J7 & J9 
Joint Precision Strike Demonstration/Joint 
Virtual Battlespace (JPSD/JVB) 
National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) 
USMC Studies and Analysis (S&A) Division 
US Army TRADOC Project Officer for One 
Semi-automated Forces (TPO OneSAF) 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory(MCWL) 
US Army Model and Simulation Office (AMSO) 
US Army TRADOC Project Officer for One 
Semi-automated Forces (TPO OneSAF) 
Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) 
US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
Centre for Defence Analysis Defence 
Evaluation Research Agency (CDA DERA (UK)) 
 Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) 
Headquarters Department of the Army, G3 (HQDA G3) 
US Army Program Executive Office for 
Simulation, Training, & Instumentation (PEO STRI) 
Intelligence Center, Space Based Laser (USAIC/SBL) 
Marine Corps Concept Development Command (MCCDC) 
 Enterprise Database Integrated Product 
Teams, Topographic Engineering Center (EDB IPT 
(TEC)) 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
Logistics Focus Area Collaborative Team (LOG FACT) 
Research Development and Engineering 
Command & Simulation Technology Center (RDECOM-
STC) 
Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation (AFAMS) 
Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Futures 
Command and Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance  Focus Area Collaborative Team 
(C4ISR FACT) 
TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC), Monterey 
TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC), White Sands Missile Range 
USMC Training, Exercises, and Military Operations (TEMO) 
American, British, Canadian, and Australian 
Armies' Program Special Working Party on Advanced 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
105 
APPENDIX B: INCOMPLETE TABLE OF MOUT FACILITIES 
This table contains some of the many MOUT facilities available to US Military 
Forces for training that were examined in the course of this research and basic statistics 
associated with each.  This table is not comprehensive and cannot be considered 
completely accurate as facilities are being built and expanded each year.  In fact the US 
Army intends to build up to 80 new MOUT sites by 2009. 
Location—Name  Size 
(1) Fort Polk—JRTC Shuttgart-Gordan MOUT  8km x 7km, 42 buildings 
(2) Fort Campbell—Cassidy MOUT site  No specific information 
(3) Fort Bragg—Fort McClellan MOUT  5 blocks, 32 buildings 
(4) Fort Drum  33 buildings 
(5) Fort Hood—St. Elijah MOUT  No specific information 
(6) Fort Lewis—Leschi Town MOUT  85-acre, 50 buildings 
(7) Schofield Barracks  20 buildings 
(8) Fort Stewart—Em Karo Village  9 buildings 
(9) Fort Benning—McKenna MOUT   16 buildings 
(10) MCB Quantico—Combat Town  14 buildings 
(11) Fort Irwin—National Training Center (NTC) No specific information 
(12) Camp Pendleton  Small village 
(13) 29 Palms MC Air Ground Combat Center  140 buildings 
(14) Fort Richardson   990-acre IPBC; 200-acre ISBC 
(15) Fort Knox—Zussman Village  30-acre city, 21 buildings 
(18) Fort Carson   16 buildings 
(19) Camp Lejeune   30 buildings 
(20) Camp Blanding   16 buildings 
(22) Camp Hansen   No specific information 
(24) NAS North Island   No specific information 
(25) Fort Wainwright   17 buildings 
(26) Camp Dawson   Airfield with terminal buildings 
(27) Kuwait—Udairi training range   20 km by 27 km, mock buildings 
(28) South Korea—Yongtari MOUT  small city block 
(30) Southern California Logistics Airport (SCLA)—Victorville  200 acres 
(31) Camp Bullis, Texas   26 acres, 19 buildings
(33) Fort Leavenworth  No specific information 
(34) The Urban Target Complex (UTC)—Yodaville  178 Buildings 






































APPENDIX C: CASUALTY FIGURES  
This appendix contains the month-to-month casualty figures that resulted from 
combat operations in Iraq from March 2003 through January 2005.  The month of 
November is the portion of the data concerned with this research.  The other information 
is provided to give the reader perspective on the casualties experienced in the period 






























APPENDIX D: FOUR DAYS OF OPERATION DAWN 
This appendix is an excerpt from the November 22, 2004 edition of the Marine 































APPENDIX E: OPERATION ORDER (OPORD) CONTENT 
Adapted from FMFRP 0-6, Marine Troop Leader's Guide, PCN 140 000060 00 in 
order to acquaint the reader with the format.  This appendix describes the general format 
for an Operation Order (OPORD) used in Crisis Action Planning (CAP).  This order is 
prepared and issued in a clear and concise manner and is preceded by a thorough 
orientation of the area of operations. 
SITUATION: Briefly state the general picture to apprise subordinate commanders of the 
current situation. 
a. Enemy Forces: Summary of enemy information that may affect the 





• estimated strengths 
• identification 
• capabilities 
Important factors to include in the summary: 
• Time: Time of enemy intelligence 
• Size: Size of enemy (i.e. squad, battalion, number of enemy) 
• Unit: Unit they are serving (i.e. Republican Guard) 
• Activity: What the enemy is doing (i.e. Preparing position) 
• Location: Position  
• Equipment: Weapons they have access to  
• DRAW-D: what are the most likely/dangerous enemy courses of 
action upon contact (Defend, Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw, Delay) 
b. Friendly Forces: Gives information on friendly HAS-S (higher, adjacent, 
supporting, and security) forces that may directly affect the action of subordinate 
commanders.  These forces include those not attached or those organic to the command 
for the contemplated operation, but whose presence on a flank or other adjacent area is of 
interest.  
MISSION: A clear and concise statement of the mission to be accomplished by the unit.  
Emphasize the purpose of the mission with the Five W’s (Who, What, When, Where, 
Why). 
EXECUTION: Summarizes the overall course of action intended, or concept of 
operations.  
a. Commander's Intent: The commander's intent is a clear, concise statement that 
defines success for the force as a whole by establishing, in advance of events, the desired 
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result.    The section contains: the purpose of the operation; the critical vulnerabilities and 
center of gravity for both enemy and friendly forces; a vision of how the operation will be 
conducted in a broad scope; a description of the result with respect to the relationship of 
the force, the enemy, and the terrain; and a description of how the result will facilitate 
future operations. 
 
b. Concept of Operations: Briefly describes how the commander visualizes the 
execution of the operation from start to completion.  Accurately conveys to subordinates 
the commander’s intent (end state of the mission/battle, purpose of the mission) so that 
mission accomplishment is possible in the time available and in the absence of additional 
communications or further instructions.  The concept should set forth the phases of the 
operation; schemes of maneuver for major subordinate task elements that describe 
precisely what the commander expects to be done; general plans for employment of 
supporting fires and weapons, including nuclear and chemical weapons; and the general 
plan for the landing force in amphibious operations.  Specifically the enemy’s critical 
vulnerability and how this critical vulnerability will be exploited. 
c. Tasks: Assigns missions to each committed organic unit in numerical or 
alphabetical sequence followed by the attached unit(s).  Specifically identifies the unit 
that is designated the main effort for this order.  
 
d. Reserve: Designates and assigns a mission to the reserve unit. 
e. Coordinating Instructions: The last paragraph in the execution section contains 
coordinating instructions pertaining to two or more elements of the task organization. 
This includes boundaries, objectives lines of departure, time and direction of attack, and 
other specifics needed to coordinate the activities of different task elements. Other 
information is also included (e.g., reporting instructions, anticipated time of execution 
(D-day and H-hour — day and hour action is initiated), when the order becomes effective 
for planning and/or execution (typically immediately)). 
ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Contains instructions regarding rations, 
ammunition, EPW handling and evacuation, aid station, resupply, control of civil 
population, refugees and administrative matters. Only necessary information is included. 
COMMAND AND SIGNAL:  
a. Communications/signal instructions and information. 






APPENDIX F: FORCE COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 
This appendix provides a graphical depiction of the communication links that 
exist in each particular type of unit as modeled in MANA. 
Note: An absence of an arrow between different units indicates that there are no 
direct links between those units (i.e. in the first diagram, the FT has no communication 
links to any other unit.) 
 
































































APPENDIX G: WEAPONS CHARACTERISTICS 
This appendix provides the manufacture specifications for the weapons modeled 




































APPENDIX H: MANA WORKSHEETS 
The many pages of this appendix allow the reader to recreate the models settings 
used in this research.  The intent is to facilitate follow-on research.  The MANA Model 
and this spreadsheet tool can be requested from TWLucas@NPS.edu 
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1 - ed Insurgent 3 5 1
4 - ed Riflem n 1 4 
5 - ed Mortars 1 1 
6 - 6 Red MG Team 1 1 
- 15 Red Rocketeer 9 1 RPG 
Red Scout 1 1 1 AK47 
17 - 17 Red IED S 1
1 1 
- 19 Yellow Civilian 1 75 75  
1 75 






e 4 AK47 
1 82mm 
1 .50 Cal MG 
7 9 
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1 1 
 AK47 
IED 8 - 18 IED 
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19 
- 20 Green Media 1 2 
21 - 21 Blue Recon Tm M16A2  1 6 6 
22 - 22 Blue Sniper Tm 1 1 M82A1A 1 
23 - 23 Blue Howitzer r Tm Indirect Fire /Morta 1 4 4 
24 - 25 Blue Mach 2  Gun ine Gun Tm 2 1  Machine
26 - 27 Blue SMA 2 
7 15 
28  Infantry R an 9 18  
- 45 Blue Infantry SAW 9 1 SAW 
46 - 54 Blue Infantry M203 9 1 9 M203 
55 - 57 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr 3 1 3 M16A2 
58 - 58 
Blue Infantry Platoon 
Cmd 1 5 5 M16A2 
31 44 
59 - 64 Blue DO Rifleman 6 2 12 M16A2 
65 - 70 Blue DO SAW 6 1 6 SAW 
71 - 76 Blue DO M203 6 1 6 M203 
77 - 79 Blue DO Team C2 3 4 12 M16A2 
80 - 81 
Blue DO Command 
Group 2 4 8 M16A2 
23 44 
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W Tm 2 1 MK153 
- 36 Blue iflem 2 M16A2
37 9 
       Summary mix 1 agents 
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1 Default State 50 50 30 60 30 10







3 Taken Shot (Pri) 50 50 50 30 60 30 14
2 2 3 15 2 20 2
5 Shot At (Pri) -7
5
80 80 30 60 30 10
3 2 3 15 2 20 2
7 Enemy Contact 90 60 60 30 60 30 14
1 2 3 15 2 20 2
15 Squad En Contact 90 60 60 30 60 30 90 90 90 14
0 2 3 15 2 20 2
36 Run Start 25 2 3 0 2 10
0 2
1 Default State 50 50 20 70 30 14







3 Taken Shot (Pri) 60 40 40 20 70 30 14
6 2 3 11 3 35 2
5 Shot At (Pri) -4
5
50 50 20 70 30 28 2 3 11 3 35 2
7 Enemy Contact 80 50 50 20 70 30 14
5 2 3 11 3 35 2
15 Squad En Contact 80 60 60 20 70 30 80 80 80 14
4 2 3 11 3 35 2
36 Run Start 25 2 3 0 3 10
0 2






3 Taken Shot (Pri) -5
0
50 50 30 60 30 14
8 2 3 11 2 10 2
5 Shot At (Pri) -9
0
80 80 30 60 30 64 2 3 11 2 20 2
7 Enemy Contact -9
0
60 60 30 60 30 89 2 3 11 2 20 2
36 Run Start 25 2 3 0 2 10
0 2
1 Default State 14




3 Taken Shot (Pri) 37 2 3 3 10 2
36 Run Start 25 2 3 3 10 2







3 Taken Shot (Pri) 50 50 50 30 60 30 14
6 2 3 11 2 30 2
5 Shot At (Pri) -7
5
80 80 30 60 30 28 2 3 11 2 30 2
7 Enemy Contact 90 60 60 30 60 30 14
5 2 3 11 2 30 2
15 Squad En Contact 90 60 60 30 60 30 90 90 90 14
4 2 3 11 2 30 2
36 Run Start 25 2 3 2 10
0 2





5 Shot At (Pri) -7
5
80 80 30 60 30 53 2 3 15 2 10 2
7 Enemy Contact -5
0
60 60 30 60 30 14
5 2 3 15 2 10 2
36 Run Start 25 2 3 0 2 10
0 2




5 Shot At (Pri) -7
5
80 80 30 60 30 53 2 3 5 2 70 2
36 Run Start 25 2 3 0 2 10
0 2
1 Default State 14
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1 Default State 
-5
0
20 20 50 70 52 0 0 10
0
15 1 10 2 X X
36 Run Start 





1 Default State 
50 85 76 1 0 20
0
15 1 20 2 X X
36 Run Start 







































































































































































1 Default State 
50 50 85 10 45 30 -1
0
1 1 3 15 5 80 4 X X
2 Reach Waypoint 




3 1 3 4 5 90 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 






1 3 15 5 80 4 X X
5 Shot At (Pri) 






1 3 15 5 80 4 X X
36 Run Start 







1 Default State 
1 1 3 0 5 60 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 
13
6
1 3 0 5 60 4 X X
36 Run Start 







1 Default State 





3 Taken Shot (Pri) 





36 Run Start 








1 Default State 
50 50 85 10 45 30 -1
0
1 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
2 Reach Waypoint 




3 1 3 4 5 30 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 






1 3 11 5 50 4 X X
5 Shot At (Pri) 




53 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
7 Enemy Contact 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
15 Squad En Contact 




85 85 85 50 10 13
4
1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
35 Reach Final Waypoint 
20 80 80 0 0 45 30 0 3 1 3 2 5 30 4 X X
36 Run Start 
0 1 3 5 10
0
4 0 0
1 Default State 
50 50 85 10 45 30 -1
0
1 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
2 Reach Waypoint 




3 1 3 4 5 50 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
5 Shot At (Pri) 




78 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
7 Enemy Contact 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
15 Squad En Contact 




85 85 85 50 10 13
1
1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
35 Reach Final Waypoint 
20 80 80 0 0 45 30 0 3 1 3 4 5 30 4 X X
36 Run Start 


















































































































































































































1 Default State 
50 50 85 10 45 30 -1
0
1 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
2 Reach Waypoint 




3 1 3 4 5 50 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
5 Shot At (Pri) 




78 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
7 Enemy Contact 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
15 Squad En Contact 




85 85 85 50 10 12
7
1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
35 Reach Final Waypoint 
20 80 80 0 0 45 30 0 3 1 3 4 5 30 3 X X
36 Run Start 
0 1 3 0 5 10
0
2 X X
1 Default State 
50 50 85 10 45 30 -1
0
1 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
2 Reach Waypoint 




3 1 3 4 5 50 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
5 Shot At (Pri) 




78 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
7 Enemy Contact 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
15 Squad En Contact 




85 85 85 50 10 12
7
1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
35 Reach Final Waypoint 
20 80 80 0 0 45 30 0 3 1 3 4 5 30 3 X X
36 Run Start 




1 Default State 
50 50 85 10 45 30 -1
0
1 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
2 Reach Waypoint 




3 1 3 4 5 50 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 
50 50 50 20 -2
0
45 40 10 12
9
1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
5 Shot At (Pri) 




78 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
7 Enemy Contact 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
15 Squad En Contact 




85 85 85 50 10 12
7
1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
35 Reach Final Waypoint 
20 80 80 0 0 45 30 0 3 1 3 4 5 30 3 X X
36 Run Start 





1 Default State 
50 50 85 10 45 30 -1
0
1 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
2 Reach Waypoint 




3 1 3 4 5 50 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
5 Shot At (Pri) 




78 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
7 Enemy Contact 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
15 Squad En Contact 




85 85 85 50 10 12
7
1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
35 Reach Final Waypoint 
20 80 80 0 0 45 30 0 3 1 3 4 5 30 3 X X
36 Run Start 




1 Default State 
50 50 85 10 45 30 -1
0
1 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
2 Reach Waypoint 




3 1 3 4 5 50 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
5 Shot At (Pri) 




78 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
7 Enemy Contact 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
15 Squad En Contact 




85 85 85 50 10 12
7
1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
35 Reach Final Waypoint 
20 80 80 0 0 45 30 0 3 1 3 4 5 30 3 X X
36 Run Start 















































































































































































































1 Default State 
50 50 85 10 45 30 -1
0
1 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
2 Reach Waypoint 




3 1 3 4 5 50 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
5 Shot At (Pri) 




78 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
7 Enemy Contact 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
15 Squad En Contact 




85 85 85 50 10 12
7
1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
35 Reach Final Waypoint 
20 80 80 0 0 45 30 0 3 1 3 4 5 30 3 X X
36 Run Start 




1 Default State 
50 50 85 10 45 30 -1
0
1 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
2 Reach Waypoint 




3 1 3 4 5 50 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
5 Shot At (Pri) 




78 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
7 Enemy Contact 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
15 Squad En Contact 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
35 Reach Final Waypoint 
20 80 80 0 0 45 30 0 3 1 3 4 5 30 3 X X
36 Run Start 




1 Default State 
50 50 85 10 45 30 -1
0
1 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
2 Reach Waypoint 




3 1 3 4 5 50 4 X X
3 Taken Shot (Pri) 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
5 Shot At (Pri) 




78 1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
7 Enemy Contact 






1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
15 Squad En Contact 




85 85 85 50 10 12
7
1 3 11 5 30 4 X X
35 Reach Final Waypoint 
20 80 80 0 0 45 30 0 3 1 3 4 5 30 3 X X
36 Run Start 
0 1 3 0 5 10
0
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Agent Memory 30 seconds
Intra-Squad - min link Rank low
Squad Threa 30 Inorganic Threat Persistance 30
Fuse Unknow No Fuse Unknowns on Inorg map No
Fuse Time - Fuse Time -
Fuse Radius - Fuse Radius -
Outbound Comm Link X
Type # Range Capacity Buffer Latency Self Reliab. Acc. MxAge Rank Filter Include Delivery
21 22 Blue Sniper Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 23 Blue Howitzer/Mortar Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 24 Blue Machine Gun Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 25 Blue Machine Gun Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 26 Blue SMAW Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 27 Blue SMAW Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 55 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 56 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 57 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 58 Blue Infantry Platoon Cmd y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 80 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
21 81 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
24 55 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
24 56 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
24 57 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
24 58 Blue Infantry Platoon Cmd y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
24 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
24 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
24 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
24 80 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
24 81 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
25 55 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
25 56 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
25 57 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
25 58 Blue Infantry Platoon Cmd y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
25 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
25 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
25 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
25 80 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
25 81 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
26 55 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
26 56 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
26 57 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
26 58 Blue Infantry Platoon Cmd y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
26 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
26 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
26 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
26 80 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
26 81 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
27 55 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
27 56 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
27 57 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
27 58 Blue Infantry Platoon Cmd y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
27 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
27 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
27 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
27 80 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
27 81 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
55 56 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
55 57 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 7 PRC 150 164054 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
55 58 Blue Infantry Platoon Cmd y 8 PRC 150 164054 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
56 55 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
56 57 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 7 PRC 150 164054 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
56 58 Blue Infantry Platoon Cmd y 8 PRC 150 164054 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
57 55 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
57 56 Blue Infantry Squad Ldr y 7 PRC 150 164054 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
57 58 Blue Infantry Platoon Cmd y 8 PRC 150 164054 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
58 22 Blue Sniper Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
58 23 Blue Howitzer/Mortar Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
58 24 Blue Machine Gun Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
58 25 Blue Machine Gun Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
58 26 Blue SMAW Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
58 27 Blue SMAW Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
59 65 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
59 71 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
59 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
60 66 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
60 72 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
60 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
61 67 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
61 73 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
61 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
62 68 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
62 74 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
62 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
63 69 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
63 75 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
63 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
64 70 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
64 76 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
64 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
65 59 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
65 71 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
65 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
66 60 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
66 72 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
66 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
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67 73 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
67 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
68 62 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
68 74 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
68 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
69 63 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
69 75 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
69 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
70 64 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
70 76 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
70 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
71 59 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
71 65 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
71 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
72 60 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
72 66 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
72 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
73 61 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
73 67 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
73 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
74 62 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
74 68 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
74 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
75 63 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
75 69 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
75 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
76 64 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
76 70 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
76 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 59 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 60 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 65 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 66 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 71 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 72 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 21 Blue Recon Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 22 Blue Sniper Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 23 Blue Howitzer/Mortar Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 24 Blue Machine Gun Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 26 Blue SMAW Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
77 80 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 61 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 62 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 67 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 68 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 73 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 74 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 21 Blue Recon Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 22 Blue Sniper Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 23 Blue Howitzer/Mortar Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 24 Blue Machine Gun Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 26 Blue SMAW Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
78 80 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 63 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 64 Blue DO Rifleman y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 69 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 70 Blue DO SAW y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 75 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 76 Blue DO M203 y 3 al Role Radi 1641 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 21 Blue Recon Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 22 Blue Sniper Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 23 Blue Howitzer/Mortar Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 25 Blue Machine Gun Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 27 Blue SMAW Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
79 81 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
80 21 Blue Recon Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
80 22 Blue Sniper Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
80 23 Blue Howitzer/Mortar Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
80 24 Blue Machine Gun Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
80 26 Blue SMAW Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
80 77 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
80 78 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
80 81 Blue DO Command Group y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
81 21 Blue Recon Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
81 22 Blue Sniper Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
81 23 Blue Howitzer/Mortar Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
81 25 Blue Machine Gun Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
81 27 Blue SMAW Tm y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F
81 79 Blue DO Team C2 y 6 PRC 117 37732 1 10 10 120 93 100 30 High SNETC F-N-F




























APPENDIX I: SURVEY  
This survey was developed to assess MOUT training perceptions and gauge the 
realism of MOUT Training Facility experiences.  This survey was conducted with 251 
Marines who were pre-qualified to have combat experience from Iraq.  The insights from 













APPENDIX J: BRIEF  
The brief on the following pages was presented to the Operations Analysis 
Directorate (OAD), MCCDC on the September 8th 2005, TECOM on September 9th 
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